Majority
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schmidt, J.), dated November 9, 2001, as granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1).
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) is denied.
The plaintiff allegedly sustained personal injuries when he fell from a ladder while working on an asbestos-removal project in a New York City public school. The Supreme Court erred in granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1). “To impose liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1), there must be a violation of the statute and that violation must be a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries” (Tama v Gargiulo Bros., Inc., 61 AD3d 958 , 960 [2009]; see Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 NY3d 280 , 287 [2003]). “Where there is no statutory violation, or where the plaintiff is the sole proximate cause of his or her own injuries, there can be no recovery under Labor Law § 240 (1)” (Treu v Cappelletti, 71 AD3d 994 , 997 [2010]).
In support of his motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted a copy of the transcript of his testimony at a hearing pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h. At that hearing he testified that the 10-foot A-frame ladder from which he fell was in an open and locked position at the time of the accident, and that it was positioned on an uneven floor composed of broken concrete and sand or dirt. He testified that he was standing near the top of the ladder and was leaning forward to apply a plastic covering to the wall when the ladder suddenly moved
Since the plaintiff did not establish his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the motion should have been denied without regard to the sufficiency of the defendants’ opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 , 853 [1985]). Florio, J.E, Dickerson, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Tama v. Gargiulo Bros., Inc. 61 AD3d 958 at 960 p. 724
- Blake v. Neighborhood Housing Services of New York City, Inc. 1 NY3d 280 at 287 p. 724
- Treu v. Cappelletti 71 AD3d 994 at 997 p. 724
- Reyes v. Khan 90 AD3d 734 p. 725
- Delahaye v. Saint Anns School 40 AD3d 679 at 682 p. 725
- Seepersaud v. City of New York 38 AD3d 753 at 754 p. 725
- Taglioni v. Harbor Cove Associates 308 AD2d 441 at 442 p. 725
- Chan v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc. 284 AD2d 290 p. 725
- Boguszewski v. Solo Salon & Spa 309 AD2d 777 at 778 p. 725
- Costello v. Hapco Realty, Inc. 305 AD2d 445 at 446 p. 725
- Winegrad v. New York University Medical Center 64 NY2d 851 at 853 p. 725