Majority
We reject defendant’s contention that the “main purpose” of the checkpoint was general crime control. Rather, the evidence at the suppression hearing established that the checkpoint was established as a “safety” checkpoint (People v Dugan, 57 AD3d 300 , 300 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 924 [2009]). We further conclude that the checkpoint was effective in advancing that interest (see People v Scott, 63 NY2d 518 , 528-529 [1984]). Finally, we conclude that the degree of intrusion on liberty and privacy interests was minimal (see id. at 526-527 ; Dugan, 57 AD3d at 300 ). Unlike in People v Trotter ( 28 AD3d 165 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 839 [2006]), where the checkpoint was conducted as part of a longer campaign to address general crime concerns, there is no evidence here to suggest that the checkpoint was part of a broader program of general crime control, or that it was “no more than a ‘key pragmatic tool’ ” in a larger campaign to control crime (id. at 170). Present — Scudder, P.J., Centra, Valentino, Whalen and Martoche, JJ.
Cases cited
- People v. Dugan 57 AD3d 300 at 300 p. 1644
- People v. Scott 63 NY2d 518 at 528-529 p. 1644
- People v. Trotter 28 AD3d 165 p. 1644