Majority
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Richard A. Dollinger, A.J.), entered March 5, 2012. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the motion of defendant for an order finding plaintiff in contempt and directing plaintiff to provide defendant with medical insurance coverage and granted that part of the cross motion of plaintiff to terminate his obligation to provide defendant with medical insurance coverage.
It is hereby ordered that the order insofar as appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, that part of plaintiffs cross motion seeking an order terminating his obligation to provide defendant with the same level of medical insur
We agree with defendant that the court erred in terminating plaintiffs obligation to provide her with medical insurance coverage inasmuch as our prior order requires plaintiff to provide her with that coverage. As a general rule, the doctrine of res judicata bars relitigation of previously adjudicated disputes “even where further investigation of the law or facts indicates that the controversy has been erroneously decided, whether due to oversight by the parties or error by the courts” (Matter of Reilly v Reid, 45 NY2d 24 , 28 [1978]; see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Williams, 29 AD3d 688 , 690 [2006]). As relevant here, “a final judgment of divorce settles the parties’ rights pertaining not only to those issues that were actually litigated, but also to those that could have been litigated” (Xiao Yang Chen v Fischer, 6 NY3d 94 , 100 [2005]; see Rainbow v Swisher, 72 NY2d 106 ,110 [1988]; Cudar v Cudar, 98 AD3d 27 , 31 [2012]; see generally Boronow v Boronow, 71 NY2d 284 , 286, 290-291 [1988]). “[A]bsent unusual circumstances or explicit statutory authorization, the provisions of [such a] judgment are final and binding on the parties, and may be modified only upon direct challenge” (Rainbow, 72 NY2d at 110 ). Here, plaintiff did not take an appeal from our prior order, seek reargument of that order, or make a proper application to modify it. He is therefore foreclosed from collaterally attacking it in the context of this action (see Jeannotte v Jeannotte, 235 AD2d 711 , 714 [1997]; Lippman v Lippman, 204 AD2d 1057 , 1057-1058 [1994]; see generally Cohen v Kinzler, 222 AD2d 393 , 394 [1995], lv denied 88 NY2d 802 [1996]).
Cases cited
- Lo Maglio v. Lo Maglio 273 AD2d 823 p. 1183
- Reilly v. Reid 45 NY2d 24 at 28 p. 1183
- Allstate Insurance v. Williams 29 AD3d 688 at 690 p. 1183
- Xiao Yang Chen v. Fischer 6 NY3d 94 at 100 p. 1183
- Rainbow v. Swisher 72 NY2d 106 at 110 p. 1183
- Cudar v. Cudar 98 AD3d 27 at 31 p. 1183
- Boronow v. Boronow 71 NY2d 284 at 286, 290-291 p. 1183
- Jeannotte v. Jeannotte 235 AD2d 711 at 714 p. 1183
- Cohen v. Kinzler 222 AD2d 393 at 394 p. 1183