Majority
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing so much of the first, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action as alleged intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and substituting therefor a provision granting those branches of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The defendants failed to make a prima facie showing of their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the first, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action in their entirety on the ground that the alleged acts of the defendants’ employees were outside the scope of their employment (see Riviello v Waldron, 47 NY2d 297 , 302 [1979]; White v Alkoutayni, 18 AD3d 540 , 541 [2005]; Beauchamp v City of New York, 3 AD3d 465 , 466-467 [2004]; Rausman v Baugh, 248 AD2d 8 , 10-11 [1998]; cf. N.X. v Cabrini Med. Ctr., 97 NY2d 247 , 251 [2002]; Judith M. v Sisters of Charity Hosp., 93 NY2d 932 [1999]; Dia CC. v Ithaca City School Dist., 304 AD2d 955 [2003]; Mary KK. v Jack LL., 203 AD2d 840 , 841 [1994]; see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 , 562 [1980]; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 , 324 [1986]).
However, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing so much of the first, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action as alleged intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Public policy bars claims alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress against governmental entities (see Eckardt v City of White Plains, 87 AD3d 1049 [2011]; Ellison v City of New Rochelle, 62 AD3d 830 [2009]; Lillian C. v Administration for Children’s Servs., 48 AD3d 316 , 317 [2008]; Pezhman v City of New York, 47 AD3d 493 , 494 [2008]; Wyllie v District Attorney of County of Kings, 2 AD3d 714 , 720 [2003]). Further, the allegations of negligent infliction of emotional distress were duplicative of the viable portions of the subject causes of action (see Fischer v Maloney, 43 NY2d 553 , 558 [1978]; Leonard v Reinhardt, 20 AD3d 510 [2005]; Brancaleone v Mesagna, 290 AD2d 467 , 468 [2002]; Ghaly v Mardiros, 204 AD2d 272 , 273 [1994]).
Cases cited
- Riviello v. Waldron 47 NY2d 297 at 302 p. 713
- Beauchamp v. City of New York 3 AD3d 465 at 466-467 p. 713
- Rausman v. Baugh 248 AD2d 8 at 10-11 p. 713
- N. X. v. Cabrini Medical Center 97 NY2d 247 at 251 p. 713
- Judith M. v. Sisters of Charity Hospital 93 NY2d 932 p. 713
- Dia CC. v. Ithaca City School District 304 AD2d 955 p. 713
- Zuckerman v. City of New York 49 NY2d 557 at 562 p. 713
- Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital 68 NY2d 320 at 324 p. 713
- Ellison v. City of New Rochelle 62 AD3d 830 p. 713
- Lillian C. v. Administration for Children's Services 48 AD3d 316 at 317 p. 713
- Pezhman v. City of New York 47 AD3d 493 at 494 p. 713
- Wyllie v. District Attorney 2 AD3d 714 at 720 p. 713
- Fischer v. Maloney 43 NY2d 553 at 558 p. 713
- Leonard v. Reinhardt 20 AD3d 510 p. 713
- Brancaleone v. Mesagna 290 AD2d 467 at 468 p. 713
- Ghaly v. Mardiros 204 AD2d 272 at 273 p. 713