Majority
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Sher, J.), entered November 19, 2010, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Pursuant to section 256A (1), no civil action may be maintained against the City to recover damages for personal injuries caused by a dangerous condition on the subject boardwalk unless prior written notice of the condition has been filed in the office of the Commissioner of Public Works of the City. Prior written notice statutes are strictly construed (see Gorman v Town of Huntington, 12 NY3d 275 , 279 [2009]; Poirier v City of Schenectady, 85 NY2d 310 , 313 [1995]), and only two exceptions are recognized, “namely, where the locality created the defect or hazard through an affirmative act of negligence and where a special use confers a special benefit upon the locality” (Amabile v City of Buffalo, 93 NY2d 471 , 474, [1999] [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Abano v Suffolk County Community Coll., 66 AD3d 719 [2009]).
Here, the complaint did not allege one of the recognized exceptions. Thus, the City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by proffering the affidavit of its Commissioner of Public Works, in which he asserted that he had searched the City’s prior written notice record book and had found no records indicating that the City had received prior written notice of the alleged defective condition at the location of the boardwalk identified by Chirco (see Magee v Town of Brookhaven, 95 AD3d 1179 , 1180 [2012]; Politis v Town of Islip, 82 AD3d 1191 [2011]; McCarthy v City of White Plains, 54 AD3d 828 , 829 [2008]; cf. Carlucci v Village of Scarsdale, 104 AD3d 797 [2013]).
In opposition, Chirco failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the City received prior written notice of the alleged dangerous condition, or whether either of the two exceptions to the prior written notice rule applied (see Yarborough v City of New York, 10 NY3d 726 , 728 [2008]; Amabile v City of Buffalo, 93 NY2d at 474 ; Oliveri v Village of Greenport, 93 AD3d 773 ,
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that the City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint, and that Chirco failed to raise a triable issue sufficient to defeat the motion (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 , 324 [1986]). Angiolillo, J.R, Chambers, Hall and Roman, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 2010 NY Slip Op 33405 (U).]
Cases cited
- Gorman v. Town of Huntington 12 NY3d 275 at 279 p. 942
- Poirier v. City of Schenectady 85 NY2d 310 at 313 p. 942
- Amabile v. City of Buffalo 93 NY2d 471 at 474 p. 942
- Magee v. Town of Brookhaven 95 AD3d 1179 at 1180 p. 942
- Politis v. Town of Islip 82 AD3d 1191 p. 942
- McCarthy v. City of White Plains 54 AD3d 828 at 829 p. 942
- Carlucci v. Village of Scarsdale 104 AD3d 797 p. 942
- Yarborough v. City of New York 10 NY3d 726 at 728 p. 942
- Oliveri v. Village of Greenport 93 AD3d 773 p. 942
- Arcabascio v. City of New York 91 AD3d 684 at 684-685 p. 943
- Farrago v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 17 AD3d 631 at 633 p. 943
- Kiszenik v. Town of Huntington 70 AD3d 1007 at 1008 p. 943
- Granderson v. City of White Plains 29 AD3d 739 at 740 p. 943
- Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital 68 NY2d 320 at 324 p. 943