Majority
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly denied the appellant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1), (3) and (4) to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale that was entered upon his default in appearing or answering the complaint. As to that branch of the appellant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (4), the process server’s affidavit of service constituted prima facie evidence of service of the summons and complaint pursuant to CPLR 308 (1) (see Reich v Redley, 96 AD3d 1038 [2012]), and the appellant’s bare and unsubstantiated denial of receipt was insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service (see U.S. Bank N.A. v Tate, 102 AD3d 859 [2013]; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v DaCosta, 97 AD3d 630 , 631 [2012]). Therefore, a hearing on the issue of service was not required (see US Natl. Bank Assn. v Melton, 90 AD3d 742 [2011]; Scarano v Scarano, 63 AD3d 716 [2009]). To the extent the appellant argues that the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of his motion which was to vacate the default judgment of foreclosure and sale pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1), he failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his default since the only excuse he proffered was that he was not served with process (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Pietranico, 102 AD3d 724 , 724 [2013]). The absence of a reasonable excuse for the default renders it unnecessary to determine whether the appellant demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious defense (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cervini, 84 AD3d 789 , 790 [2011]).
Regarding that branch of the appellant’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3), despite the appellant’s allegations of improper practices by the plaintiffs agents in unrelated matters, he failed to meet his burden of establishing fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct on the part of the plaintiff in this matter which could warrant vacatur of the default judgment of foreclosure and sale pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3) (see Onewest Bank, FSB v Martinez, 101 AD3d 969 , 970 [2012]; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Hunter, 100 AD3d 810 , 811 [2012]; Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v Hornes, 94 AD3d 755 [2012]; Tribeca Lending Corp. v Crawford, 79 AD3d 1018 , 1020 [2010]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the appellant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1), (3) and (4) to vacate the default judgment of foreclosure and sale. Dillon, J.P., Chambers, Austin and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Reich v. Redley 96 AD3d 1038 p. 753
- U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Tate 102 AD3d 859 p. 753
- Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. DaCosta 97 AD3d 630 at 631 p. 753
- US National Bank Ass'n v. Melton 90 AD3d 742 p. 753
- Scarano v. Scarano 63 AD3d 716 p. 753
- Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pietranico 102 AD3d 724 at 724 p. 753
- Wells Fargo Bank v. Cervini 84 AD3d 789 at 790 p. 753
- Onewest Bank, FSB v. Martinez 101 AD3d 969 at 970 p. 753
- Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Hunter 100 AD3d 810 at 811 p. 753
- Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Hornes 94 AD3d 755 p. 753
- Tribeca Lending Corp. v. Crawford 79 AD3d 1018 at 1020 p. 753