Majority
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Steuben County (Joseph W. Batham, A.J.), entered May 22, 2012 in a proceeding pursuant to CPBR article 78 and RPTB article 7. The order granted the motion of respondents Assessor of the Town of Geneva, Town of Geneva, and Board of Assessment Review of Town of Geneva to dismiss the proceeding.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this hybrid CPLR
We reject petitioner’s contention that the court erred by dismissing its amended petition insofar as it asserted claims pursuant to CPLR article 78. Article 7 of the RPTL “is the exclusive procedure for review of property [tax] assessments ‘unless otherwise provided by law’ ” (Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v City School Dist. of City of Troy, 59 NY2d 262 , 268 [1983], quoting RPTL 700 [1]). Moreover, it is well settled that “proceeding[s] pursuant to CPLR article 78 [are] not the proper vehicle[s] for challenging the tax assessments], inasmuch as challenges to assessments on the grounds that they are illegal, irregular, excessive, or unequal[ ] are to be made in a certiorari proceeding under RPTL article 7” (Matter of ViaHealth of Wayne v VanPatten, 90 AD3d 1700 , 1701 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Board of Mgrs. of Greens of N. Hills Condominium v Board of Assessors of County of Nassau, 202 AD2d 417 , 419 [1994], lv denied 83 NY2d 757 [1994]). Unless the party challenging the tax assessment is asserting that “ ‘the taxing authority acted entirely without jurisdiction or that the tax itself is unconstitutional, ’ ” which is not the case here, “ ‘the sole vehicle for review of a tax assessment is pursuant to [RPTL] article 7’ ” (Matter of AES Somerset, LLC v Town of Somerset, 24 AD3d 1263 , 1264 [2005]; see Samuels v Town of Clarkson, 91 AD2d 836 , 837 [1982]; see also County of Erie v Danitz, 100 AD2d 725 , 725-726 [1984]).
Petitioner further contends that respondents could not base their denial of a tax exemption for the subject parcel on the ground that petitioner’s use of the property was in violation of the existing zoning restrictions because, inter alia, it had never been cited for or given notice of a zoning violation. We reject that contention. The fact that petitioner used the subject property for “hospital purposes” as that term is used in the RPTL is
Cases cited
- Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. City School District 59 NY2d 262 at 268 p. 1044
- ViaHealth of Wayne v. VanPatten 90 AD3d 1700 at 1701 p. 1044
- Samuels v. Town of Clarkson 91 AD2d 836 at 837 p. 1044
- Congregation Or Yosef v. Town of Ramapo 48 AD3d 731 at 732 p. 1045
- Colella v. Board of Assessors 266 AD2d 286 at 287 p. 1045
- Colella v. Board of Assessors 95 NY2d 401 p. 1045
- McGann v. Incorporated Village of Old Westbury 293 AD2d 581 at 584 p. 1045
- City of Lackawanna v. State Board of Equalization & Assessment 16 NY2d 222 at 230 p. 1045
- People v. Brooklyn Garden Apartments, Inc. 283 NY 373 at 380 p. 1045