Majority
Appeal from a judgment of the Ontario County Court (William F. Kocher, J.), rendered November 10, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of manslaughter in the first degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her upon a jury verdict of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]). We reject defendant’s contention that she was denied effective assistance of counsel based upon her
Nor was defense counsel ineffective in failing to object to alleged hearsay testimony concerning out-of-court statements made by the victim. The testimony at issue was admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of establishing the victim’s deteriorated physical condition at the time his statements were made (see generally People v DiFabio, 170 AD2d 1028 , 1029 [1991], affd 79 NY2d 836 [1992]). In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that the testimony at issue constituted inadmissible hearsay, the single error by defense counsel in failing to object to its admission was not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial (see People v Hobot, 84 NY2d 1021 , 1022 [1995]; People v Cosby, 82 AD3d 63 , 67 [2011], lv denied 16 NY3d 857 [2011]). Defense counsel’s failure to renew the motion for a trial order of dismissal does not constitute ineffective assistance inasmuch as the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction and renewal of the motion had “ ‘little or no chance of success’ ” (People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143 , 152 [2005]; see People v Holt, 93 AD3d 1304 , 1305 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 933 [2012]).
Defendant failed to preserve for our review her further contention that she was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor’s improper questions on cross-examination concerning the veracity of prosecution witnesses (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Washington, 89 AD3d 1516 , 1516-1517 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 963 [2012]), and we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15 [6] [a]).
Finally, we reject defendant’s contention that she was penalized for exercising her right to trial and that the sentence is otherwise unduly harsh and severe. “[T]he mere fact that a sentence imposed after trial is greater than that offered in connection with plea negotiations is not proof that defendant was punished for asserting [her] right to trial” (People v Dorn, 71 AD3d 1523 , 1524 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]), nor does that fact render the sentence unduly harsh or severe (see People v Rawleigh, 89 AD3d 1483 , 1485 [2011], lv denied 18
Cases cited
- People v. Russo 4 AD3d 133 at 133 p. 1323
- People v. DiFabio 170 AD2d 1028 at 1029 p. 1323
- People v. DiFabio 79 NY2d 836 p. 1323
- People v. Hobot 84 NY2d 1021 at 1022 p. 1323
- People v. Cosby 82 AD3d 63 at 67 p. 1323
- People v. Caban 5 NY3d 143 at 152 p. 1323
- People v. Holt 93 AD3d 1304 at 1305 p. 1323
- People v. Washington 89 AD3d 1516 at 1516-1517 p. 1323
- People v. Dorn 71 AD3d 1523 at 1524 p. 1323
- People v. Rawleigh 89 AD3d 1483 at 1485 p. 1323