Majority
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Firetog, J.), rendered December 14, 2009, convicting him of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court’s Sandoval ruling (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 , 376 [1974]) was not improper. “The extent to which the prosecution should be allowed to impeach the credibility of a defendant is a matter that is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court” (People v Rodriguez, 111 AD3d 856 , 858 [2013]; see People v Bennette, 56 NY2d 142 , 146 [1982]). Here, the court’s Sandoval ruling permitting the People to inquire as to whether the defendant had been convicted of three felonies and one misdemeanor, but precluding any questioning about the underlying facts of those prior crimes, avoided any undue prejudice to the defendant and constituted a provident exercise of the court’s discretion (see People v Brown, 101 AD3d 895 , 896 [2012]; People v Murad, 55 AD3d 754 , 755 [2008]; People v Jamison, 303 AD2d 603 [2003]). The fact that the defendant may have been the only possible source of testimony for his defense increased the importance of his credibility and his testimony, and did not mandate a ruling prohibiting inquiry about his prior criminal conduct (see People v Hayes, 97 NY2d 203 , 208 [2002]; People v Lopez, 37 AD3d 496 , 497 [2007]; People v Cruz, 21 AD3d 967 , 968 [2005]).
The defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in precluding certain cross-examination of a detective who had testified on the People’s behalf at the suppression hearing. At trial, the detective testified that he had prepared a written state
The defendant’s challenges to certain remarks made by the prosecutor during summation are unpreserved for appellate review, as the defendant either did not object to the challenged remarks, or made only a general objection, and his motion for a mistrial, made after the completion of summations, was untimely (see People v Allen, 114 AD3d 958 , 959 [2014]; People v Read, 97 AD3d 702 , 703 [2012]; People v Malave, 7 AD3d 542 [2004]). In any event, the challenged remarks either constituted fair comment on the evidence (see People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105 , 109 [1976]; People v Gouveia, 88 AD3d 814 , 815 [2011]), were responsive to arguments and theories presented in the defense’s summation (see People v Herb, 110 AD3d 829 , 831 [2013]; People v Crawford, 54 AD3d 961 , 962 [2008]), were permissible rhetorical comment (see People v Brown, 84 AD3d 1263 [2011]), or constituted harmless error (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d at 241-242 ).
Skelos, J.E, Lott, Roman and LaSalle, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- People v. Sandoval 34 NY2d 371 at 376 p. 909
- People v. Rodriguez 111 AD3d 856 at 858 p. 909
- People v. Bennette 56 NY2d 142 at 146 p. 909
- People v. Brown 101 AD3d 895 at 896 p. 909
- People v. Murad 55 AD3d 754 at 755 p. 909
- People v. Hayes 97 NY2d 203 at 208 p. 909
- People v. Crimmins 36 NY2d 230 at 241-242 p. 910
- People v. Greene 110 AD3d 827 at 829 p. 910
- People v. Allen 114 AD3d 958 at 959 p. 910
- People v. Read 97 AD3d 702 at 703 p. 910
- People v. Ashwal 39 NY2d 105 at 109 p. 910
- People v. Gouveia 88 AD3d 814 at 815 p. 910
- People v. Herb 110 AD3d 829 at 831 p. 910