Majority
Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Alice Schlesinger, J.), entered August 21, 2013, which granted the petition to the extent of annulling the determination of the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor (Commission) revoking petitioner’s longshoreman’s registration, effective December 18, 2012, and remanded to the Commission for further proceedings before a different administrative law judge and a new determination consistent with the terms of the court’s decision, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the order and judgment vacated, the petition treated as one transferred to this court for de novo review, and, upon such review, the determination of the Commission confirmed, the petition denied and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 dismissed.
Since the petition raises an issue of substantial evidence, in the absence of “other objections as could terminate the proceeding” (CPLR 7804 [g]), “the proceeding should have been transferred to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804 (g)” (Matter of Cruz v New York City Hous. Auth., 106 AD3d 631 , 631 [1st Dept 2013]).
In this case, there was testimony that petitioner attended two parties that were also attended by an associate of an organized crime group. The parties were hosted by the crime associate’s son, who invited petitioner (see Matter of Beneky v Waterfront Commn. of N.Y. Harbor, 42 NY2d 920 , 921 [1977], cert denied 434 US 940 [1977]). There was sufficient evidence to refute petitioner’s claim that her attendance at the same parties as the person in question was accidental or inadvertent. Petitioner also admitted to making remarks to coworkers about being “best friends” with this person and “hanging out” with him, and insofar as petitioner suggested that she was not serious about such remarks, the ALJ was not required to credit her testimony (see Matter of Berenhaus v Ward, 70 NY2d 436 , 443-444 [1987]).
When a court finds an agency’s determination to be supported by substantial evidence, the court should not upset the penalty imposed unless it is “so disproportionate to the offense ... as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness” (Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222 , 233 [1974] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, we find that the penalty of revocation of petitioner’s registration does not shock one’s sense of fairness. By associating with individuals with connections to organized crime and boasting about such associations to other longshoremen, petitioner engaged in conduct which potentially undermines the Commission’s continuing efforts to ensure public safety by reducing corruption on the waterfront.
Concur — Acosta, J.P., DeGrasse, Richter, ManzanetDaniels and Feinman, JJ.
Cases cited
- CC Lumber Co. v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor 31 NY2d 350 at 358 p. 430
- Beneky v. Waterfront Commission 42 NY2d 920 at 921 p. 430
- Berenhaus v. Ward 70 NY2d 436 at 443-444 p. 430
- Pell v. Board of Education 34 NY2d 222 at 233 p. 430