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People v. Edwards

120 A.D.3d 1435 Court N.Y. App. Div. Decision date 2014-09-24 English

Judges Skelos, J.P, Dickerson, Austin and Duffy, JJ., concur.

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p. 1435
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lee Anderson Edwards, Appellant.
[992 NYS2d 368]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Latella, J.), rendered April 1, 2011, convicting him of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (three counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to cause the death of the victim. Here, intent can be inferred from the defendant’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances (see People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296 , 301 [1977]; People v Bryant, 39 AD3d 768 , 769 [2007]).

Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 , 348 [2007]), we nevertheless accord

p. 1436
great deference to the factfinder’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 , 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The defendant’s contention that the People’s summation remarks constituted reversible error is largely unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Tonge, 93 NY2d 838 [1999]; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10 , 19-20 [1995]; People v Heide, 84 NY2d 943 , 944 [1994]; People v Williams, 46 NY2d 1070 , 1071 [1979]). In any event, the summation comments alleged to be inflammatory and prejudicial were either fair comment on the evidence (see People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105 , 109-111 [1976]), responsive to arguments and theories presented in the defense summation (see People v Galloway, 54 NY2d 396 [1981]; People v Crawford, 54 AD3d 961 [2008]), stricken, thereby dissipating any prejudice resulting from the improper comment (see People v Berg, 59 NY2d 294 [1983]; People v Arce, 42 NY2d 179 , 187 [1977]; People v Gouveia, 88 AD3d 814 , 815-816 [2011]), or constituted harmless error (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 , 241-242 [1975]; People v Persaud, 98 AD3d 527 , 529 [2012]).

The defendant’s contention that the Supreme Court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor called a witness who, when asked if she recognized anyone in the courtroom, responded that she could not remember, is without merit (see People v Berg, 59 NY2d at 298 ; People v Berry, 110 AD3d 1002 , 1002 [2013]; People v Alston, 71 AD3d 684 , 685 [2010]; People v Torres, 141 AD2d 682 [1988]).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d at 242 ).

Skelos, J.P, Dickerson, Austin and Duffy, JJ., concur.

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