Majority
Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Anthony F. Aloi, J.), rendered June 1, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of driving while intoxicated, a class D felony, aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree and leaving the scene of an incident without reporting.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of, inter alia, driving while intoxicated as a class D felony (Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1192 [3]; 1193 [1] [c] [ii]) and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree (§511 [3] [a] [i]), defendant contends that the verdict with respect to those counts is contrary to the weight of the evidence with respect to the issue of intoxication. We reject that contention.
We note at the outset that the conviction of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree does not require proof of intoxication, and we thus reject defendant’s contention with respect to that crime. Unlike the driving while intoxicated count, which requires proof that defendant was intoxicated (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]), the aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree count may be sustained upon proof that defendant was driving while his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (1) (see People v Gelster, 256 AD2d 1133 , 1133 [1998]; see e.g. People v Kaminski, 109 AD3d 1186 , 1186 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1088 [2014]; People v DeCarlis, 37 AD3d 1040 , 1040 [2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 945 [2007]), and it is well settled that a “ ‘[c]onviction of [that] offense [does] not require proof of intoxication, but only [requires proof] that defendant’s driving ability was impaired to any extent’ ” by the consumption of alcohol (People v McDonald, 27 AD3d 949 , 950 [2006]). Here, defendant concedes in his brief that the weight of the evidence supports a finding that his driving ability was impaired by his consumption of alcohol.
In any event, we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence on the issue of intoxication. “Where, as here, witness credibility is of paramount importance to the determination of guilt or innocence, we must give great deference
Defendant further contends that the persistent felony offender statutory scheme is unconstitutional in light of the rule in Apprendi v New Jersey ( 530 US 466 [2000]). To the contrary, it is well settled that Penal Law § 70.10 and CPL 400.20 are constitutional (see People v Battles, 16 NY3d 54 , 59 [2010], cert denied 565 US —, 132 S Ct 123 [2011]; People v Quinones, 12 NY3d 116 , 122-131 [2009], cert denied 558 US 821 [2009]). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.
Present— Smith, J.P, Fahey, Lindley, Whalen and DeJoseph, JJ.
Cases cited
- People v. Kaminski 109 AD3d 1186 at 1186 p. 1568
- People v. McDonald 27 AD3d 949 at 950 p. 1568
- People v. Streeter 118 AD3d 1287 at 1288 p. 1569
- People v. Roman 107 AD3d 1441 at 1442-1443 p. 1569
- People v. Scott 107 AD3d 1635 at 1636 p. 1569
- People v. Purvis 90 AD3d 1339 at 1341 p. 1569
- People v. Bleakley 69 NY2d 490 at 495 p. 1569
- Apprendi v. New Jersey 530 US 466 p. 1569
- People v. Battles 16 NY3d 54 at 59 p. 1569
- People v. Quinones 12 NY3d 116 at 122-131 p. 1569