Majority
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of rape in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.35 [1]), sexual abuse in the first degree (§ 130.65 [1]), and rape in the third degree (§ 130.25 [3]). Viewing the evidence in light of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 , 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 , 495 [1987]). “[RJesolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the jury” (People v Witherspoon, 66 AD3d 1456 , 1457 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 942 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]) and “[w]here, as here, the defendant’s challenge is focused upon the credibility of the witnesses, we [must] accord ‘great deference to the resolution of credibility issues by the trier of fact because those who see and hear the witnesses can assess their credibility and reliability in a manner that is far superior to that of reviewing judges who must rely on the printed record’ ” (People v Cole, 111 AD3d 1301 , 1302 [2013], lv denied 23 NY3d 1019 [2014]).
Contrary to the People’s contention, we conclude that defendant preserved his challenge to County Court’s Sandoval ruling (cf. People v Manning, 286 AD2d 690 , 690 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 684 [2001]), but we nevertheless conclude that defendant’s challenge lacks merit (see People v Hayes, 97 NY2d 203 , 207-208 [2002]; People v Ayala, 27 AD3d 1087 , 1089 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 892 [2006]). We reject defendant’s further contention that the court erred in refusing to suppress statements that he made to the police. “The suppression hearing testimony established that defendant’s initial statement[ ] [was] made spontaneously and [was] not in response to any police questioning or its functional equivalent, and defendant’s later statements were made after defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and had waived them” (People v Burnett, 41 AD3d 1201 , 1202 [2007]; see People v Irvin, 111 AD3d 1294 , 1295 [2013] ; see generally People v Thomas, 22 NY3d 629 , 641-642 [2014]). Finally, we conclude that the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.
Present — Smith, J.P, Fahey, Lindley, Valentino and DeJoseph, JJ.
Cases cited
- People v. Danielson 9 NY3d 342 at 349 p. 1596
- People v. Bleakley 69 NY2d 490 at 495 p. 1596
- People v. Hayes 97 NY2d 203 at 207-208 p. 1596
- People v. Burnett 41 AD3d 1201 at 1202 p. 1596
- People v. Irvin 111 AD3d 1294 at 1295 p. 1596
- People v. Thomas 22 NY3d 629 at 641-642 p. 1596