Majority
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Aloise, J.), rendered July 14, 2010, convicting him of assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered.
The defendant allegedly shot the complainant in the face during an argument over a broken door. The defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
During deliberations, the jury sent the court a note stating: “We the jury request a readback of Gary Richards’ testimony.” Richards was a witness who was with the complainant at the time that he was shot. Without first reading the note to counsel outside of the presence of the jury, the trial court, with all parties and the jury present, stated on the record that the jury had requested a “read-back of Gary Richards’s testimony.” It then stated “[w]e are prepared to give it to you right now. This is direct examination of Gary Richards by [the prosecutor].” At that point, the direct examination testimony of Richards was read back to the jury and then the trial court instructed the jury to return to their deliberations. The cross-examination of Richards was not read back to the jury.
On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court’s procedure for handling the jury note requesting a readback of
Furthermore, by providing the jury with only a partial readback, the trial court violated its separate obligation under CPL 310.30 to provide a “meaningful response” to the jury (People v Kisoon, 8 NY3d at 134 ). While defense counsel did not object to the partial readback, this error, too, is not subject to the preservation rule, since it is evident from the record that the trial court failed to satisfy this core responsibility (see id. at 134-135 ). Although a defense counsel who is given notice of the trial court’s intended response might be expected to object at a time when counsel “had an opportunity to ask [the court] to alter course” (People v Alcide, 21 NY3d at 694 ), counsel here had no such opportunity because he learned of the trial court’s response at the same time the jury heard it. The trial court
The defendant’s contention that the trial court’s instructions to the jury on the issue of reasonable doubt were constitutionally inadequate is without merit because the instructions, on the whole, conveyed the correct standard to be employed by the jury (see People v Fields, 87 NY2d 821 , 823 [1995]; People v King, 73 AD3d 1083 , 1084 [2010]; People v Coles, 62 AD3d 1022 , 1023 [2009]; People v Love, 37 AD3d 618 , 619 [2007]; People v Sanchez, 29 AD3d 608 [2006]; People v Reyes, 207 AD2d 362 , 362-363 [1994]). However, the trial court is cautioned to rely on the most recent version of New York’s Criminal Jury Instructions rather than recite from older versions.
Dillon, J.R, Leventhal, Hall and Cohen, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- People v. O'Rama 78 NY2d 270 at 277-278 p. 836
- People v. Alcide 21 NY3d 687 at 692 p. 836
- People v. Kisoon 8 NY3d 129 at 134 p. 836
- People v. Starling 85 NY2d 509 at 516 p. 836
- People v. Clark 108 AD3d 797 at 800 p. 837
- People v. Lewis 262 AD2d 584 at 584 p. 837
- People v. Fields 87 NY2d 821 at 823 p. 837
- People v. Coles 62 AD3d 1022 at 1023 p. 837