Majority
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries and wrongful death, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kerrigan, J.), entered August 21, 2013, which granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with General Municipal Law § 50-h.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, and the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with General Municipal Law § 50-h is denied.
On July 18, 2010, the plaintiff’s decedent allegedly was severely injured when she was struck by a bicyclist on a bicycle trail near Cunningham Park in Queens County. The decedent served a notice of claim upon the defendants on September 23, 2010, three days prior to her death. Approximately one month thereafter, the defendants served the attorney who would have represented the decedent before her death with a demand for an oral examination of the decedent pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h. In response to the demand, counsel requested an adjournment of the hearing, which was granted, and thereafter requested three additional adjournments, explaining that the decedent had died and that the estate was in the process of obtaining an administrator. Counsel’s final letter informed the defendants that the proposed administrator was ready, willing, and able to testify at a hearing. Thereafter, the defendants did not serve any further demands for a hearing. On October 12, 2011, the plaintiff, as administrator of the decedent’s estate, commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries and wrongful death. On June 3, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with General Municipal Law § 50-h. The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion.
Under the circumstances of this case, the failure to appear for an examination pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h should have been excused in light of the decedent’s death before service of the demand for her examination, the administrator’s willingness to appear at a hearing, and the defendants’ failure to demand the examination of any other person (see Steenbuck v Sklarow, 63 AD3d at 824 ; Twitty v City of New York, 195 AD2d at 356 ; Hur v City of Poughkeepsie, 71 AD2d 1014 , 1015 [1979]). Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with their demand to examine pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h should have been denied.
The plaintiff’s remaining contentions either are improperly raised for the first time on appeal or need not be considered in view of the foregoing (see Bruno v Sant’Elia, 52 AD3d 556 , 557 [2008]).
Rivera, J.P., Hall, Austin, Miller and Maltese, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Ross v. County of Suffolk 84 AD3d 775 at 775-776 p. 682
- Steenbuck v. Sklarow 63 AD3d 823 at 824 p. 682
- Kemp v. County of Suffolk 61 AD3d 937 at 938 p. 682
- Arcila v. Incorporated Village of Freeport 231 AD2d 660 at 661 p. 682
- Twitty v. City of New York 195 AD2d 354 at 356 p. 682
- Alford v. City of New York 115 AD2d 420 at 421-422 p. 682
- Alford v. City of New York 67 NY2d 1019 p. 682
- Hur v. City of Poughkeepsie 71 AD2d 1014 at 1015 p. 682
- Bruno v. Sant'Elia 52 AD3d 556 at 557 p. 682