Majority
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kerrigan, J.), entered September 11, 2013, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff was riding his motocross bicycle, popularly known as a BMX bike, on a dirt bike trail in Cunningham Park in Queens when he allegedly was injured while jumping his bicycle off of a dirt mound.
The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that the action was barred by the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, since the plaintiff voluntarily jumped his bicycle from one dirt mound to another on the trail and, thus, assumed the risk of injury. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and we affirm.
Under the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, a person who voluntarily participates in a sporting or recreational activity generally consents, by his or her participation, to those injury-causing events, conditions, and risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the activity (see Morgan v State
In support of their motion, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff assumed the risk of his injuries by voluntarily jumping his bicycle from the subject dirt mound, and that the plaintiff was fully aware of the condition of the mound at the time of the accident, as he successfully jumped off the mound twice prior to the accident (see Calise v City of New York, 239 AD2d at 378 ). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to show that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk was inapplicable. The plaintiff submitted the affidavit of an engineer, who had no stated expertise relating to motocross bicycling, and, in any event, the affidavit was speculative, conclusory, and lacking in foundation (see Boyle v Pottery Barn Outlet, 117 AD3d 665 [2014]; Paladino v Time Warner Cable of N.Y. City, 16 AD3d 646 , 648 [2005]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Balkin, J.P., Hall, Austin and Barros, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Morgan v. State 90 NY2d 471 at 484 p. 672
- Turcotte v. Fell 68 NY2d 432 at 439 p. 672
- Brown v. City of New York 69 AD3d 893 at 893 p. 672
- Dobert v. State 8 AD3d 873 p. 672
- Vecchione v. Middle Country Central School District 300 AD2d 471 p. 672
- Verro v. New York Racing Ass'n 142 AD2d 396 p. 672
- Ziegelmeyer v. United States Olympic Committee 7 NY3d 893 p. 672
- Sykes v. County of Erie 94 NY2d 912 p. 672
- Rivera v. Glen Oaks Village Owners, Inc. 41 AD3d 817 at 820-821 p. 672
- Calise v. City of New York 239 AD2d 378 at 379 p. 672
- Boyle v. Pottery Barn Outlet 117 AD3d 665 p. 672
- Paladino v. Time Warner Cable 16 AD3d 646 at 648 p. 672