People v. Peters

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Hayden, J.), rendered March 9, 2012, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of manslaughter in the second degree and unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine in the third degree.

In the early morning hours of May 8, 2011, defendant and Gary Varían were manufacturing crystal methamphetamine in a remote cabin in Chemung County. In so doing, they placed three plastic pitchers containing lantern fuel on a lit wood-burning stove. The fuel ignited, causing a fire that burned the cabin to the ground. While all four of the cabin’s occupants exited the building, the victim later died in the hospital as a result of severe burns covering the majority of her body. Defendant was thereafter charged with manslaughter in the second degree and unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine in the third degree and, following a jury trial, was convicted of both charges. He appeals, challenging the legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting his conviction of manslaughter in the second degree.

Defendant specifically asserts that the People failed to establish that he caused the victim’s death, as the evidence did not exclude the possibility that the fire resulted from a third party opening the wood stove door. Defendant further argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove that his actions

The trial evidence established that defendant, Varían, Brian Yontz and the victim were at Varlan’s cabin and had used methamphetamine. In the hours before the fire erupted, defendant and Varían proceeded to the basement to make a batch of crystal methamphetamine. Varían then brought two plastic pitchers of lantern fuel upstairs to the living room and placed them on top of a grate on the surface of the wood stove. When defendant ascended to the living room, he placed a third plastic pitcher of lantern fuel on the wood stove, on top of three rings, which he believed were made of metal. According to Yontz, who was seated in the living room reading, defendant then became absorbed in looking for something and panicked when he realized that he had “left the pitcher [on the stove for] too long,” melting the bottom of the pitcher so that when defendant attempted to lift it, fuel ran down the side of the stove and caught fire. Defendant countered Yontz’s description by testifying that, after placing the plastic pitcher on the wood stove, he briefly exited the cabin and, when he returned, a blaze had ignited around the wood stove. Varían and the victim were in a back room and, although Varían managed to escape nearly unharmed, the victim was the last to exit the cabin and, when she did so, she was enveloped in flames.

Although defendant now contends that the fire may have been ignited by Yontz opening the wood stove door and exposing the fuel to an open flame, Yontz, Varían and defendant himself all testified that the wood stove door was not opened following the placement of the plastic pitchers on the stove’s surface. Furthermore, an arson investigator with the State Of

Turning to the mens rea element of manslaughter in the second degree, defendant contends that, based on assurances from Varían, he believed his placement of the plastic pitcher of fuel on the active wood stove was safe, and that he therefore was not aware of and did not consciously disregard an unjustifiable risk of death. However, defendant conceded that he knew that lantern fuel was highly flammable, that he had previously caused a fire while manufacturing methamphetamine using ether, that the plastic pitchers would “obviously melt” if placed on a hotplate and that he was aware of other “meth fire[s] [and] meth lab explosions.” Upon our review of the evidence, we find that it was legally sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of manslaughter in the second degree (see People v Lewie, 17 NY3d 348 , 358 [2011]; People v DaCosta, 6 NY3d 181 , 182 [2006]; People v Reichel, 110 AD3d 1356 , 1364 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 1090 [2014]). Further, since a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, upon considering the evidence in a neutral light and according deference to the jury’s credibility determinations, we conclude that the verdict on the manslaughter count is not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 , 349 [2007]; People v Peterson, 118 AD3d 1151 , 1153 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1087 [2014]; People v Barreto, 64 AD3d at 1048-1049 ).

Rose, Egan Jr. and Clark, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.