Majority
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Shirley Werner
The motion court properly found that although the parties entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in March 2008 providing for plaintiff MG West 100 LLC to develop a 72,000 square foot condominium building on property owned by defendant Church, plaintiffs are not entitled to specific performance. Religious Corporations Law § 12 precludes the Church from selling property without obtaining the consent of the bishop and the standing committee of the diocese prior to court approval of such sale (see Church of God of Prospect Plaza v Fourth Church of Christ, Scientist, of Brooklyn, 54 NY2d 742 , 744 [1981]).
In support of their argument that the church obtained the requisite approval, plaintiffs rely on double hearsay statements regarding what the bishop and the standing committee purportedly said to the former rector. The statements, which do not fall within any exception to the hearsay rule, are inadmissible (see Kamenov v Northern Assur. Co. of Am., 259 AD2d 958 , 959 [4th Dept 1999]). Accordingly, plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunction enjoining the Church from selling the property to anyone else and there is no basis to grant plaintiffs’ request for reinstatement of the canceled notice of pendency.
Although plaintiffs are correct that the MOU is not void ab initio since it did not violate Religious Corporations Law § 12 (cf. Soho Ctr. for Arts & Educ. v Church of St. Anthony of Padua, 146 AD2d 407 , 411 [1st Dept 1989]; Diocese of Buffalo v McCarthy, 91 AD2d 213 , 217 [4th Dept 1983], lv denied 59 NY2d 605 [1983]), this does not change the fact that they are not entitled to specific performance. The Church could not have applied for consent of the sale of the property until the transaction documents, including the contract of sale and the development agreements, were fully finalized and executed. It is undisputed that the parties never entered into the contract of sale or the development agreements.
Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover consequential damages. Any profits that plaintiffs may have made under the prospective contracts contemplated by the MOU cannot properly be awarded as damages (see Goodstein Constr. Corp. v City of New York, 80 NY2d 366 , 374 [1992]). We find no evidence in the record that lost profits were within the contemplation of the parties at the time of or prior to their execution of the MOU, since the MOU was merely a preliminary agreement by which the parties planned to proceed with their initial efforts on the construction project (see id.; Kenford Co. v County of Erie, 73 NY2d 312 , 319 [1989]; Brody Truck Rental v Country Wide Ins. Co., 277 AD2d 125 [1st Dept 2000], lv denied 96 NY2d 854 [2001]).
We have considered plaintiffs’ remaining contentions and find them unavailing.
Concur — Gonzalez, P.J., Mazzarelli, Renwick and Gische, JJ.
Cases cited
- Church of God of Prospect Plaza v. Fourth Church of Christ 54 NY2d 742 at 744 p. 625
- Kamenov v. Northern Assurance Co. of America 259 AD2d 958 at 959 p. 625
- Soho Center for Arts & Education v. Church of Saint Anthony of Padua 146 AD2d 407 at 411 p. 625
- Diocese of Buffalo v. McCarthy 91 AD2d 213 at 217 p. 625
- Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island Rail Road 70 NY2d 382 at 388 p. 626
- Goodstein Construction Corp. v. City of New York 80 NY2d 366 at 374 p. 626
- Kenford Co. v. County of Erie 73 NY2d 312 at 319 p. 626