Majority
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to permanently stay arbitration of a claim for supplementary uninsured/ underinsured motorist benefits, the appeal is from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Santorelli, J.), dated September 12, 2014, which granted the petition.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the petition is denied.
Robert Arciello (hereinafter the insured) was involved in an automobile accident with another party (hereinafter the tortfeasor) on January 10, 2012, and subsequently commenced an action against the tortfeasor to recover for his injuries. The tortfeasor’s insurer subsequently offered to settle the action for the full amount of the tortfeasor’s policy. The insured’s attorney then wrote a letter to the petitioner, Government Employees Insurance Company (hereinafter GEICO), which had issued a policy to the insured, notifying it of the settlement offer, and asked it to either consent to the settlement or advance the settlement amount to the insured, and then assume the prosecution of the action against the tortfeasor within 30 days, in accordance with the terms of both GEICO’s policy with the insured and relevant regulations of the New York State Insurance Department (see 11 NYCRR 60-2.3 [f]). Although GEICO timely prepared a letter in response, which requested additional documentation and directed the insured not to settle the action without its written consent in the interim, GEICO did not send that letter to the insured’s counsel, but instead sent it to another law firm at a different address. Accordingly, at some point after the expiration of the 30-day period, the insured settled with the tortfeasor for the amount of the policy.
The insured subsequently served GEICO with a demand for arbitration of his claim for supplementary uninsured/ underinsured motorist (hereinafter SUM) benefits under his own policy and, in response, GEICO commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to permanently stay the arbitration, arguing that the insured had improperly settled his action against the tortfeasor without its consent, as required by the policy. In seeking dismissal, GEICO relied upon its issuance of the letter requesting additional documentation regarding the settlement. The Supreme Court granted the petition and permanently stayed the arbitration. We reverse.
Here, the burden was on GEICO to come forward with sufficient facts to establish justification for a stay of arbitration (see Matter of AutoOne Ins. Co. v Umanzor, 74 AD3d 1335 [2010]; Matter of A1U Ins. Co. v Cabreja, 301 AD2d 448 [2003]). GEICO’s submission of its letter requesting additional documentation regarding the settlement, which was addressed to the wrong law firm at an address different from that of the law firm which had initially notified GEICO of the settlement offer, failed to sustain this burden. Nor did GEICO otherwise come forward with facts precluding the insured’s entitlement to SUM benefits under the policy. Accordingly, the petition to permanently stay arbitration should have been denied.
Mastro, J.R, Chambers, Maltese and Duffy, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Weinberg v. Transamerica Insurance Co. 62 NY2d 379 p. 1084
- Travelers Home & Marine Insurance v. Kanner 103 AD3d 736 p. 1084
- Integon Insurance v. Battaglia 292 AD2d 527 p. 1084
- In re Arbitration between Central Mutual Insurance & Bemiss 12 NY3d 648 at 659 p. 1084
- Progressive Northeastern Insurance v. Cipolla 119 AD3d 946 p. 1084
- Warner v. New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance 97 AD3d 1065 p. 1084
- Day v. One Beacon Insurance 96 AD3d 1678 p. 1084
- AIU Insurance Co. v. Cabreja 301 AD2d 448 p. 1084