In re Claim of Reisen

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed March 5, 2014, which ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because he refused an offer of suitable employment without good cause.

Claimant was referred by a staffing agency to work as a finisher for a millwork company on a temporary basis. He was permanently hired by the company after the temporary assignment ended, but was subsequently laid off. The staffing agency then contacted claimant and offered him another job working as a packager in a yogurt factory. Claimant declined the offer and instead filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits. The Department of Labor initially found him eligible to receive benefits. The staffing agency objected and, following extended proceedings, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ruled that claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits because he refused an offer of suitable employment without good cause. Claimant now appeals.

Pursuant to Labor Law § 593 (2), a claimant who refuses “an offer of employment for which he or she is reasonably fitted by training and experience” will be disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits (see Matter of Di Stefano [Commissioner of Labor], 304 AD2d 950 , 950 [2003]). Significantly, a “claimant need not accept every job offered but, rather[,] only those job offers which bear a reasonable relationship to [the] claimant’s skills” (Matter of Schmidt [Vestal Cent. School Dist. —Roberts], 100 AD2d 655 , 655 [1984], lv denied 63 NY2d 609 [1984]). Here, it is undisputed that claimant was skilled in finish carpentry and had no experience working in a factory. Consequently, substantial evidence does not support the Board’s decision that he refused an offer of suitable

Peters, P.J., McCarthy, Egan Jr. and Devine, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the decision is reversed, without costs, and matter remitted to the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s decision.