Majority
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The petitioners commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding after they were considered, but not selected, for promotion from a list of eligible candidates for the position of fire marshal. The petitioners alleged, inter alia, that the respondents’ determinations were arbitrary and capricious insofar as they were based not on merit, but rather upon the fact that their names also appeared on an eligible list for promotion to the position of lieutenant. Further, the petitioners alleged that the appointments that were made to the position of fire marshal were effected in violation of Civil Service Law § 61 (1), which requires that such appointees be selected from one of three highest persons on the relevant eligible list, and in violation of article V, § 6 of the New York Constitution, which requires that such appointments be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination. The Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.
Our review of an agency determination that was not made after a quasi-judicial hearing is limited to consideration of whether the determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion (see CPLR 7803 [3]; Matter of London Leasing Ltd. Partnership v Division of Hous. & Community Renewal, 98 AD3d 668 , 670 [2012]; Matter of Halperin v City of New Rochelle, 24 AD3d 768 , 770 [2005]). In such a proceeding, courts “examine whether the action taken by the agency has a rational basis,” and will overturn that action “where it is ‘taken without sound basis in reason’ or ‘regard to the facts’” (Matter of Wooley v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 15 NY3d 275 , 280 [2010], quoting Matter of Peckham v Calogero, 12 NY3d 424 , 431 [2009]; see Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222 , 232 [1974]). In demonstrating that administrative actions were taken arbitrarily or in bad faith, the petitioner bears a heavy burden of proof, for which conclusory allegations and speculative assertions will not suffice (see Matter of Knight v County of Nassau, 27 AD3d 470 , 471 [2006]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.
Mastro, J.P., Sgroi, Cohen and Duffy, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- London Leasing Ltd. Partnership v. Division of Housing & Community Renewal 98 AD3d 668 at 670 p. 958
- Halperin v. City of New Rochelle 24 AD3d 768 at 770 p. 958
- Wooley v. New York State Department of Correctional Services 15 NY3d 275 at 280 p. 958
- Peckham v. Calogero 12 NY3d 424 at 431 p. 958
- Pell v. Board of Education 34 NY2d 222 at 232 p. 958
- Knight v. County of Nassau 27 AD3d 470 at 471 p. 958
- Gomez v. Hernandez 50 AD3d 404 at 404 p. 959
- Andriola v. Ortiz 82 NY2d 320 at 324 p. 959
- Cassidy v. Municipal Civil Service Commission 37 NY2d 526 at 529 p. 959
- Delicati v. Schechter 3 AD2d 19 at 21 p. 959