Majority
In a consolidated action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited
Ordered that the cross appeal is dismissed, as the defendants Maurice Wallace and Walter Joseph are not aggrieved by the portions of the judgment cross-appealed from (see CPLR 5511; Mixon v TBV, Inc., 76 AD3d 144 [2010]); and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant County of Suffolk, payable by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff commenced two related actions to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by him in a motor vehicle accident involving a vehicle operated by the defendant Maurice Wallace and owned by the defendant Walter Joseph. The accident occurred while the vehicle operated by Wallace was being pursued by members of the Suffolk County Police Department in the course of a high-speed chase. The plaintiff commenced one action against Wallace and Joseph, and a separate action against the defendant County of Suffolk.
The two actions were consolidated. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case at the trial on the issue of liability, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict in his favor and against Wallace and Joseph on the issue of liability. The issue of the County’s liability was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the County and against the plaintiff. The Supreme Court subsequently entered a judgment on January 23, 2013, which was in favor of the County and against the plaintiff, dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against the County. That judgment also, among other things, “severed and continued” the action against Wallace and Joseph.
Wallace and Joseph cross-appeal from stated portions of the judgment. However, the cross appeal must be dismissed because the portions of the judgment cross-appealed from did not grant or deny any relief for or against Wallace or Joseph (see Mixon v TBV, Inc., 76 AD3d 144 , 152 [2010]). The order
Turning to the plaintiffs appeal, we conclude that, contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in limiting the plaintiffs use of certain deposition testimony during the questioning of the plaintiffs police witness, Sergeant Joshua Wertheim (see Feldsherg v Nitschke, 49 NY2d 636 , 644-645 [1980]; Robinson v Plaro Estates, Inc., 119 AD3d 542 , 545 [2014]; Cheathem v Ostrow, 100 AD3d 819 , 820 [2012]).
Contrary to the plaintiffs further contention, the jury charge and verdict sheet interrogatory properly directed the jury to determine whether the police pursuit was conducted with reckless disregard for the safety of others (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104; Kabir v County of Monroe, 16 NY3d 217 , 222-224 [2011]; Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553 , 557 [1997]; Saarinen v Kerr, 84 NY2d 494 [1994]; Mouzakes v County of Suffolk, 94 AD3d 829 [2012]; Elnakib v County of Suffolk, 90 AD3d 596 , 597 [2011]; Nurse v City of New York, 56 AD3d 442 , 443 [2008]; Badalamenti v City of New York, 30 AD3d 452 , 453 [2006]; Crapazano v County of Nassau, 272 AD2d 363 , 364 [2000]).
The jury’s verdict was not contrary to the weight of the credible evidence (see Vaval v NYRAC, Inc., 31 AD3d 438 [2006]; Crapazano v County of Nassau, 272 AD2d at 364 ).
Leventhal, J.P., Miller, Hinds-Radix and Maltese, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Feldsberg v. Nitschke 49 NY2d 636 at 644-645 p. 1223
- Robinson v. Plaro Estates, Inc. 119 AD3d 542 at 545 p. 1223
- Cheathem v. Ostrow 100 AD3d 819 at 820 p. 1223
- Kabir v. County of Monroe 16 NY3d 217 at 222-224 p. 1223
- Szczerbiak v. Pilat 90 NY2d 553 at 557 p. 1223
- Saarinen v. Kerr 84 NY2d 494 p. 1223
- Mouzakes v. County of Suffolk 94 AD3d 829 p. 1223
- Elnakib v. County of Suffolk 90 AD3d 596 at 597 p. 1223
- Badalamenti v. City of New York 30 AD3d 452 at 453 p. 1223
- Crapazano v. County of Nassau 272 AD2d 363 at 364 p. 1223
- Vaval v. NYRAC, Inc. 31 AD3d 438 p. 1223