Majority
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Sullivan, J.), rendered March 25, 2014, convicting her of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2) (two counts), aggravated driving while intoxicated in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2-a) (a), reckless endangerment in the second degree, failure to maintain lane, and operating a motor vehicle without a license, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing pursuant to a stipulation in lieu of motions (Ayres, J.), of the suppression of physical evidence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPL 200.20 (3) to sever the charges relating to the offenses that she committed on February 27, 2011, from those which she committed on March 23, 2012. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, she failed to demonstrate that there was substantially more proof of one incident, as compared to the other, or that there was a substantial likelihood that the jury would be unable to consider separately the proof as it related to each incident (see CPL 200.20 [3] [a]; People v Smith, 64 AD3d 619 , 620 [2009]).
However, as the defendant correctly contends, the Supreme Court should have suppressed two paper receipts that were recovered from her purse, which indicated that, prior to being stopped by police, she had patronized two bars on the night of March 23, 2012. The People failed to establish that the receipts were lawfully recovered pursuant to an inventory search, as there was no evidence the search was conducted in accordance with a standardized, written protocol (see People v Gomez, 13 NY3d 6 , 10 [2009]). Nevertheless, the erroneous admission of
The defendant’s challenges to certain comments made by the prosecutor in summation are unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Charles, 57 AD3d 556 [2008]). In any event, with the exception of one comment, the remarks were either fair comment on the evidence or within the bounds of rhetorical comment (see People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105 , 109-110 [1976]). With regard to that one comment, in which the prosecutor misstated the type of vehicle involved in an accident with the defendant on February 27, 2011, after which the defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated, that misstatement did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial (see People v Bell, 126 AD3d 993 [2015]).
The defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, as the record reveals that defense counsel provided meaningful representation (see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708 [1998]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137 [1981]).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).
Dillon, J.P., Chambers, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- People v. Smith 64 AD3d 619 at 620 p. 712
- People v. Gomez 13 NY3d 6 at 10 p. 712
- People v. Crimmins 36 NY2d 230 at 237 p. 713
- People v. Charles 57 AD3d 556 p. 713
- People v. Ashwal 39 NY2d 105 at 109-110 p. 713
- People v. Benevento 91 NY2d 708 p. 713
- People v. Baldi 54 NY2d 137 p. 713
- People v. Suitte 90 AD2d 80 p. 713