Majority
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Bangert’s Flowers appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Brathwaite Nelson, J.), dated October 15, 2014, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, by adding to the final sentence thereof the words, “as premature, without prejudice to renewal following the completion of discovery”; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs payable to the plaintiff.
On appeal, the tenant contends, among other things, that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law since it had no duty to maintain the sidewalk where the plaintiff tripped. However, the tenant’s motion for summary judgment was premature.
Amotion for summary judgment may be denied as premature where it appears that the facts essential to oppose the motion exist but cannot then be stated (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Sepulveda v Cammeby’s Mgt. Co., LLC, 119 AD3d 927 , 927 [2014]). “A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant” (Cajas-Romero v Ward, 106 AD3d 850 , 852 [2013]; see Rungoo v Leary, 110 AD3d 781 , 783 [2013]).
Here, the tenant’s motion was made before issue was joined by the owner (see City of Rochester v Chiarella, 65 NY2d 92 , 101 [1985]; Blue Is. Dev., LLC v Town of Hempstead, 131 AD3d 497 [2015]; cf. Petrozza v Franzen, 109 AD3d 650 , 652 [2013]). Furthermore, the plaintiff demonstrated that discovery, including a deposition of the owner, may result in disclosure of evidence relevant to the issue of whether the tenant had a duty to maintain the sidewalk where the plaintiff tripped (see generally Sepulveda v Cammeby’s Mgt. Co., LLC, 119 AD3d at 927 ; Bank of Am., N.A. v Hillside Cycles, Inc., 89 AD3d 653 , 654 [2011]; cf. Palka v Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 83 NY2d 579 , 588-589 [1994]; Abramson v Eden Farm, Inc., 70 AD3d 514 , 514 [2010]). In addition, the plaintiff demonstrated that facts essential to justify opposition to that portion of the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the tenant and the owner (see generally Wesolowski v St. Francis Hosp., 108 AD3d 525 , 526-527 [2013]; Jones v American Com
The tenant’s remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be addressed in light of our determination.
Leventhal, J.P., Chambers, Austin and Miller, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Cajas-Romero v. Ward 106 AD3d 850 at 852 p. 619
- Rungoo v. Leary 110 AD3d 781 at 783 p. 619
- Blue Island Development, LLC v. Town of Hempstead 131 AD3d 497 p. 619
- Petrozza v. Franzen 109 AD3d 650 at 652 p. 619
- Bank of America, N.A. v. Hillside Cycles, Inc. 89 AD3d 653 at 654 p. 619
- Palka v. Servicemaster Management Services Corp. 83 NY2d 579 at 588-589 p. 619
- Abramson v. Eden Farm, Inc. 70 AD3d 514 at 514 p. 619
- Wesolowski v. St. Francis Hospital 108 AD3d 525 at 526-527 p. 619
- Jones v. American Commerce Insurance 92 AD3d 844 at 845 p. 620