Majority
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendants John Reardon and Teresa Reardon appeal from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Pitts, J.), dated January 10, 2013, which granted the plaintiffs motion for leave to enter a default judgment against them upon their failure to answer the complaint and for an order of reference, and denied their cross motion, in effect, to vacate their default in answering the complaint, to compel the plaintiff to accept their late answer pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d), to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them as abandoned pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c) for failure to enter judgment against them within one year of their default, and to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing, and (2) an order of the same court, also dated January 10, 2013, which, inter alia, appointed a referee to ascertain and compute the amount due to the plaintiff.
Ordered that the orders are affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for leave to enter a default judgment against the appellants upon their failure to answer the complaint and for an order of reference. “ ‘On a motion for leave to enter a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215, the movant is required to submit proof of service of the summons and complaint, proof of the facts constituting the claim, and proof of the defaulting party’s default in answering or appearing’ ” (Dupps v Betancourt, 99 AD3d 855 , 855 [2012], quoting Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v RJNJ Servs., Inc., 89 AD3d 649 , 651 [2011]; see CPLR 3215 [f]). Here, in support of its motion, the plaintiff met all of these requirements (see Green Tree Servicing, LLC v Cary, 106 AD3d 691 , 692 [2013]; Dupps v Betancourt, 99 AD3d at 855 ).
The Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the appellants’ cross motion which were, in effect, to vacate their default in answering the complaint, and to compel the plaintiff to accept their late answer pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d). In order to prevail on those branches of the cross motion, the appellants were required to provide a reasonable excuse for their default and to demonstrate the existence of a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 3012 [d]; 5015 [a] [1]; U.S. Bank N.A. v Sachdev, 128 AD3d 807 , 807 [2015]; Chase
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the appellants’ cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them for failure to enter judgment against them within one year of their default (see Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v Brown, 19 AD3d 638 , 638 [2005]; North Fork Bank v Cantico Intl., 284 AD2d 442 , 442 [2001]; Grajales v Freihofer Baking Co., 283 AD2d 608 [2001]).
The appellants’ remaining contentions are without merit.
Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Dickerson, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Dupps v. Betancourt 99 AD3d 855 at 855 p. 790
- Atlantic Casualty Insurance v. RJNJ Services, Inc. 89 AD3d 649 at 651 p. 790
- Green Tree Servicing, LLC v. Cary 106 AD3d 691 at 692 p. 790
- U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Sachdev 128 AD3d 807 at 807 p. 790
- Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Minott 115 AD3d 634 at 634 p. 791
- Karalis v. New Dimensions HR, Inc. 105 AD3d 707 at 708 p. 791
- Community Preservation Corp. v. Bridgewater Condominiums, LLC 89 AD3d 784 at 785 p. 791
- Wells Fargo Bank v. Cervini 84 AD3d 789 at 789 p. 791
- Maspeth Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. McGown 77 AD3d 889 at 890 p. 791
- HSBC Bank USA, National Ass'n v. Lafazan 115 AD3d 647 at 648 p. 791
- JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Palma 114 AD3d 645 at 645-646 p. 791
- Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Brown 19 AD3d 638 at 638 p. 791