Majority
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kangs County (Toussaint, J.), dated September 3, 2014, as granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 510 (1) and 511 to change the venue of the action from Kings County to Rockland County.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a hearing in accordance herewith, and thereafter, a new determination of the defendant’s motion.
On November 15, 2013, the plaintiff Daniel Patton allegedly was injured when the vehicle he was operating collided with a tractor-trailer operated by the defendant at an intersection in Queens County. The plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendant, placing venue in Kings County based upon the defendant’s purported residence in that county as stated in the police accident report (see CPLR 503 [a]). Thereafter, the defendant served a timely demand for a change of venue, and subsequently timely moved to change the venue of the action
CPLR 503 (a) provides, in relevant part, that “the place of trial shall be in the county in which one of the parties resided when it was commenced.” “For venue purposes, a residence is where a party stays for some time with a bona fide intent to retain the place as a residence for some length of time and with some degree of permanency” (Ellis v Wirshba, 18 AD3d 805 , 805 [2005]; see Forbes v Rubinovich, 94 AD3d 809 , 810 [2012]; Furth v ELRAC, Inc., 11 AD3d 509 , 510 [2004]). Residence means living in a particular place, while domicile means “living in that locality with intent to make it a fixed and permanent home” (Matter of Newcomb, 192 NY 238 , 250 [1908]; see King v Car Rentals, Inc., 29 AD3d 205 , 210 [2006]; cf. Antone v General Motors Corp., Buick Motor Div., 64 NY2d 20 , 29-30 [1984]). In the context of determining the proper venue of an action, a party may have more than one residence (see CPLR 503 [a]; Deas v Ahmed, 120 AD3d 750 [2014]; Chehab v Roitman, 120 AD3d 736 , 737 [2014]; King v Car Rentals, Inc., 29 AD3d at 210 ).
The defendant’s submissions failed to conclusively establish that his residence was in Rockland County and that he did not have a residence in Kings County when the action was commenced (see Feather v Goglia, 65 AD3d 1186 , 1187 [2009]). Furthermore, in opposition, the plaintiffs submitted evidence showing that the defendant’s tractor-trailer was registered at an address in Kings County, which additionally raised issues of fact regarding the location of the defendant’s residence at the time of the commencement of the action (see Tiangco v Andrickson, 116 AD3d 763 , 764 [2014]; Feather v Goglia, 65 AD3d at 1187 ; Johnson v Gioia, 38 AD3d 845 [2007]). Since this issue of fact could not have been properly resolved on the papers alone,
Eng, P.J., Chambers, Roman and Barros, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Ellis v. Wirshba 18 AD3d 805 at 805 p. 830
- Forbes v. Rubinovich 94 AD3d 809 at 810 p. 830
- Furth v. Elrac, Inc. 11 AD3d 509 at 510 p. 830
- In re Revocation of Ancillary Letters Testamentary of the Estate of Newcomb 192 NY 238 at 250 p. 830
- King v. Car Rentals, Inc. 29 AD3d 205 at 210 p. 830
- Antone v. General Motors Corp. 64 NY2d 20 at 29-30 p. 830
- Deas v. Ahmed 120 AD3d 750 p. 830
- Chehab v. Roitman 120 AD3d 736 at 737 p. 830
- Feather v. Goglia 65 AD3d 1186 at 1187 p. 830
- Tiangco v. Andrickson 116 AD3d 763 at 764 p. 830
- Johnson v. Gioia 38 AD3d 845 p. 830