Majority
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to annul a determination of the Town of Eastchester and/or the Town Board of the Town of Eastchester which abolished the petitioner’s civil service position, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Hubert, J.), entered October 7, 2013, which, without a hearing, in effect, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.
Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof, in effect, denying the petition and dismissing the proceeding insofar as asserted against the respondents the Town of Eastchester and the Town Board of the Town of Eastchester; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the petitioner, payable by the respondents the Town of Eastchester and the Town Board of the Town of Eastchester, and one bill of costs to the respondent Westchester County Department of Human Resources, payable by the petitioner, the proceeding is reinstated insofar as asserted against the respondents the Town of Eastchester and
The petitioner challenges a determination of the Town of Eastchester and/or the Town Board of the Town of Eastchester (hereinafter the Town Board) which abolished her full-time civil service position as a parking enforcement officer. It is undisputed that in 2011, the Town hired four new part-time parking enforcement officers. Those part-time employees were not required to take a civil service examination, and were not represented by a union. The petitioner’s position was abolished on January 1, 2012.
As the petitioner contends, the Supreme Court erred in denying the petition without a hearing, as against the Town and Town Board. Pursuant to article V, § 6, of the New York Constitution, “[appointments and promotions in the civil service of the state and all of the civil divisions thereof, including cities and villages, shall be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination which, as far as practicable, shall be competitive.”
In light of NY Constitution, article V, § 6, a public employer may abolish a civil service position when the “discontinuance of the position would promote efficiency and economy,” provided that the employer acts in good faith (Matter of Wipfler v Klebes, 284 NY 248 , 254 [1940]; see Matter of Aldazabal v Carey, 44 NY2d 787 , 788 [1978]; Matter of Wayne v Vogel, 20 NY2d 901 , 903 [1967]; Matter of Chandler v Village of Spring Val., 104 AD3d 847 , 849 [2013]; Matter of Eugenio v City of Yonkers, N.Y., 95 AD3d 1212 [2012]; Matter of DiSanza v Town Bd. of Town of Cortlandt, 90 AD3d 659 [2011]). The Court of Appeals has stated that “[a] public employer may abolish civil service positions for the purpose of economy or efficiency, ‘as long as the position is not abolished as a subterfuge to avoid statutory protection afforded civil servants before they are discharged’ ” (Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Rockland County Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 39 AD3d 641 , 642 [2007] [citations omitted], quoting Matter of Della Vecchia v Town of N. Hempstead, 207 AD2d 484 , 484-485 [1994]). Where a public employer has abolished a civil service position, an employee challenging that determination has the burden of proving that the employer engaged in a bad faith effort to circumvent the Civil Service Law (see Matter of Aldazabal v Carey, 44 NY2d at 788 ; Matter of Wipfler v Klebes, 284 NY at 255 ; Matter of Chandler v Village of Spring Val., 104 AD3d at 849 ; Matter of Rosenthal v Gilroy, 208 AD2d 748 , 749 [1994]).
Under these circumstances, the evidence raised issues of fact warranting a hearing as to whether the petitioner’s position was abolished in a bad faith effort to circumvent the Civil Service Law, and as to whether her position was abolished in conformity with the doctrine of legislative equivalency (see Matter of Neumann v Heyman, 49 AD3d 1336 [2008]; Matter of Rosenthal v Gilroy, 208 AD2d 748 [1994]; Matter of Hartman v Erie 1 BOCES Bd. of Educ., 204 AD2d 1037 [1994]; see also Matter of Chandler v Village of Spring Val., 104 AD3d at 849 ).
The Town and Town Board assert that the petitioner may not properly raise claims regarding alleged violations of the Taylor Law (see Civil Service Law art 14), or as to certain job classification determinations made by the Westchester County Department of Human Resources. However, the petitioner raises no such claims in the petition. The petitioner was not required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing this proceeding, as this case does not involve a matter within the scope of the grievance provisions of the applicable collective bargaining agreement (see Matter of Neumann v Heyman, 49 AD3d 1336 [2008]).
The Supreme Court erred in dismissing the petition insofar as asserted against the Town and Town Board on the alternative ground of non-joinder of a necessary party (see CPLR 1001; see also Chestnut Ridge Assoc., LLC v 30 Sephar Lane, Inc., 129 AD3d 885 [2015]; Matter of TransGas Energy Sys., LLC v New York State Bd. on Elec. Generation Siting & Envt., 65 AD3d 1247 , 1249-1250 [2009]).
Dillon, J.P., Chambers, Hall and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Wipfler v. Klebes 284 NY 248 at 254 p. 865
- Wayne v. Vogel 20 NY2d 901 at 903 p. 865
- Chandler v. Village of Spring Valley 104 AD3d 847 at 849 p. 865
- Eugenio v. City of Yonkers 95 AD3d 1212 p. 865
- Disanza v. Town Board of Cortlandt 90 AD3d 659 p. 865
- Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. Rockland County Board of Cooperative Educational Services 39 AD3d 641 at 642 p. 865
- Della Vecchia v. Town of North Hempstead 207 AD2d 484 at 484-485 p. 865
- Torre v. County of Nassau 86 NY2d 421 at 426 p. 866
- Neumann v. Heyman 49 AD3d 1336 p. 866
- Hartman v. Erie 1 Boces Board of Education 204 AD2d 1037 p. 866
- Chestnut Ridge Associates, LLC v. 30 Sephar Lane, Inc. 129 AD3d 885 p. 866
- TransGas Energy Systems., LLC v. New York State Board on Electric Generation Siting & Environment 65 AD3d 1247 at 1249-1250 p. 866