Majority
Although defendant did not preserve his claim that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the convictions of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, we find, as the People concede, that a forged letter of recommendation is not a forged instrument under that statute (see People v Sengupta, 121 AD3d 575 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 1077 [2015]). Accordingly, we exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction to reduce those counts to third-degree possession.
Defendant’s legal sufficiency claims as to the commercial bribe receiving and attempted falsification of business records counts are unpreserved, and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we reject them on the merits. We also find that the verdict as to these counts was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 , 348-349 [2007]). Regardless of whether any specific amount of economic loss could be attributed to a particular act of commercial bribe receiving, the testimony abundantly established that the economic loss suffered by the victim exceeded $250 for purposes of those counts. The evidence also supported the inference that defendant acted in concert to sell the forged academic transcript at issue (see Penal Law § 20.00). As to the attempt count, the evidence that defendant received another person’s personal information, and possessed a computer with access to a college’s student information system and other supplies needed to forge a transcript for that person, established that defendant came “dangerously near commission of the completed crime” (People v McGee, 20 NY3d 513 , 519 [2013]).
Defendant failed to preserve his constitutional challenge to the admission of hearsay, his challenge to the court’s Molineux ruling, and his argument that the count of computer trespass was duplicitous, and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find that they are without merit, and that any error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 , 242 [1975]).
Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is unreviewable since it involves matters not reflected in or fully explained by the record (see People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705 , 709 [1988]). Although defendant made a CPL 440.10 motion that was denied, he failed to obtain permission from this Court to appeal; accordingly, the merits of the ineffectiveness claim are not properly before us (see People v Polanco, 121 AD3d 436 , 437 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1221 [2015]). In the alternative, insofar as the record permits review, we find that defendant received effective assistance under the state and federal standards (see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708 , 713-714 [1998]; Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]). Concur — Friedman, J.P., Sweeny, Renwick, Andrias and Moskowitz, JJ.
Cases cited
- People v. Sengupta 121 AD3d 575 p. 517
- People v. Danielson 9 NY3d 342 at 348-349 p. 517
- People v. McGee 20 NY3d 513 at 519 p. 517
- People v. Diaz 209 AD2d 1 at 4-6 p. 518
- People v. Crimmins 36 NY2d 230 at 242 p. 518
- People v. Rivera 71 NY2d 705 at 709 p. 518
- People v. Polanco 121 AD3d 436 at 437 p. 518
- People v. Benevento 91 NY2d 708 at 713-714 p. 518
- Strickland v. Washington 466 US 668 p. 518