Majority
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Quinn, J.), rendered April 24, 2014, convicting him of attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree (two counts), aggravated criminal contempt (two counts), criminal contempt in the first degree (two counts), and endangering the welfare of a child, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant’s contention that the Supreme Court should have, sua sponte, ordered an additional competency evaluation of the defendant or a second competency hearing is without merit. On two separate occasions, the court issued an order of examination pursuant to CPL 730.30 (1). The psychologist and the psychiatrist designated as the psychiatric examiners pursuant to those respective orders each found the defendant fit to proceed. A psychiatrist retained by defense counsel to evaluate the defendant prepared a report and did not conclude that the defendant was unfit to proceed. The court conducted a competency hearing and considered the report of the psychiatrist retained by defense counsel, the reports and testimony of the designated psychiatric examiners, and testimony of civilian witnesses. Based upon this evidence, the court providently exercised its discretion in determining that the defendant was competent and fit to proceed to trial (see People v Burley, 118 AD3d 720 , 720 [2014]; People v Bennett, 63 AD3d 1086 , 1087 [2009]; People v Berry, 45 AD3d 693 [2007]).
The defendant also contends that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to ensure that he was fit to proceed, and did not request an adjournment of the competency hearing in order to retain another psychiatrist to evaluate him or move for a second competency hearing. The record as a whole reveals that the defendant received meaningful representation (see People v Jermain, 56 AD3d 1165 [2008]; People v Ferrer, 16 AD3d 913 , 914-915 [2005]; see generally People v Colon, 61 AD3d 772 , 773 [2009]), and that counsel’s representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness (see generally Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 , 688 [1984]). “[T]here can be no deprivation of effective assistance of counsel arising from counsel’s failure to make a motion that had little or no chance of success” (People v Shaffer, 81 AD3d 989 , 990 [2011]).
Cases cited
- People v. Burley 118 AD3d 720 at 720 p. 860
- People v. Ferrer 16 AD3d 913 at 914-915 p. 860
- People v. Colon 61 AD3d 772 at 773 p. 860
- Strickland v. Washington 466 US 668 at 688 p. 860
- People v. Shaffer 81 AD3d 989 at 990 p. 860
- People v. Narbonne 131 AD3d 626 at 627 p. 861
- People v. Carr 89 AD3d 1033 at 1034 p. 861
- People v. Hemion 37 AD3d 616 at 616-617 p. 861
- People v. Azor 124 AD3d 671 at 672 p. 861
- People v. Lopez 71 NY2d 662 at 666 p. 861
- People v. Rodriguez 83 AD3d 449 p. 861
- People v. Gordon 107 AD3d 739 at 740 p. 861
- People v. Keiser 100 AD3d 927 at 928-929 p. 861
- People v. Booth 23 AD3d 766 at 767 p. 861
- People v. Briggs 21 AD3d 652 at 653 p. 861