Majority
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), entered September 26, 2014, which granted defendant Ruderman’s motion to dismiss the complaint as against him, unanimously modified, on the law, to deny the motion as to the causes of action for fraud and violation of sections 273 and 275 of the Debtor and Creditor Law as against Ruderman, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiffs seek approximately $1.3 million in payment for advertising services furnished to defendant Bainbridge & Knight Laboratories, Inc. Defendant Ruderman is the owner and chairman of Bainbridge.
The amended complaint alleges that between March 2011 and July 2012, Bainbridge issued approximately 184 insertion orders to plaintiff American Media, Inc. for the publication of numerous ads in magazines owned by plaintiffs. Of the approximately $2.3 million total price, $1.3 million is alleged still to be owing for advertising services.
Plaintiffs’ allegations in support of piercing the corporate veil to hold Ruderman liable for Bainbridge’s alleged breaches of contract, i.e., that Bainbridge “ignored corporate formalities” and was totally dominated by Ruderman, are conclusory and therefore insufficient to warrant piercing the corporate veil (see Metropolitan Transp. Auth. v Triumph Adv. Prods., 116 AD2d 526 , 528 [1st Dept 1986]).
The unjust enrichment claim fails because the subject matter of the claim is governed by express contracts (Wilmoth v Sandor, 259 AD2d 252 , 254 [1st Dept 1999]).
The complaint adequately states a cause of action for fraud as against Ruderman based on alleged misrepresentations of present fact concerning the capitalization of Bainbridge and
The complaint, on this CPLR 3211 (a) (7) motion, adequately states a claim for violation of sections 273 and 275 of the Debtor and Creditor Law as against Ruderman. Ruderman is alleged to have repaid loans to himself at a time when Bainbridge was insolvent, or rendered insolvent thereby. An insider payment is not in good faith, regardless of whether or not it was paid on account of an antecedent debt. “The requirement of good faith is not fulfilled through preferential transfers of corporate funds to directors, officers or shareholders of a corporation that is, or later becomes, insolvent, in derogation of the rights of general creditors” (Matter of EAC of N.Y., Inc. v Capri 400, Inc., 49 AD3d 1006 , 1007 [3d Dept 2008] [transfer of assets to corporate officer to satisfy antecedent debt lacked good faith]; American Panel Tec v Hyrise, Inc., 31 AD3d 586 [2d Dept 2006] [same]). The claim does not involve the failure to pay the amounts owed under the contract, but rather Ruderman’s inappropriately
Cases cited
- Wilmoth v. Sandor 259 AD2d 252 at 254 p. 477
- Deerfield Communications Corp. v. Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc. 68 NY2d 954 at 956 p. 478
- First Bank of the Americas v. Motor Car Funding, Inc. 257 AD2d 287 at 292 p. 478
- Gonzalez v. 40 West Burnside Avenue LLC 107 AD3d 542 p. 478
- CIFG Assurance North America, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. 106 AD3d 437 p. 478
- EAC of New York, Inc. v. Capri 400, Inc. 49 AD3d 1006 at 1007 p. 478
- American Panel Tec v. Hyrise, Inc. 31 AD3d 586 p. 478