Majority
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Melvin L.
This action arises from a failed contract for the purchase of a multifamily property owned by defendant. Plaintiff buyer refused to close without prior court approval of the sale. The motion court correctly determined that defendant was not required to obtain such approval.
Defendant is a not-for-profit corporation created by a special act of the Legislature in 1912 (L 1912, ch 153, as amended). While the Special Act limits defendant’s ability to purchase real property, it places no limit on its ability to sell or otherwise dispose of the property (see id.). “Under familiar principles of statutory construction, the general provisions of section 12 of the Religious Corporations Law,” which require, among other things, that court approval be obtained prior to the sale of real property owned by a religious corporation (see Religious Corporations Law § 12 [1]), “must yield to the provisions of the special act whereby the [defendant] came into corporate existence” (Bush v Bush, 91 Misc 2d 389 , 391 [Sup Ct, Rockland County 1977]; see also Diocese of Buffalo v McCarthy, 91 AD2d 213 , 217 [4th Dept 1983], lv denied 59 NY2d 605 [1983]). Accordingly, even assuming, without deciding, that defendant is a “religious corporation” within the meaning of the Religious Corporations Law (see Religious Corporations Law § 2), the motion court correctly determined that it is not subject to the law’s mandate that it obtain leave of court before selling its real property.
Nor was prior court approval for the sale required by Not-For-Profit Corporation Law § 510, as defendant established, via the submission of financial statements and affidavits from its secretary and certified public accountant, that the premises did not compromise “all, or substantially all,” of its assets (N-PCL 510 [a]).
Nor did the parties’ contract require prior court approval for the sale. The rider to the contract made the sale “contingent upon [defendant] obtaining [court] approval, pursuant to the Religious Corporations Law and the Not-For-Profit Corpora
Given the foregoing determination, plaintiff had no lawful excuse for failing to close on the scheduled time-of-the-essence closing date. Accordingly, the motion court correctly determined that plaintiff had defaulted under the terms of the contract, entitling defendant, which appeared ready, willing and able to close at the scheduled time, to retain the down payment as liquidated damages. Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Acosta, Andrias and Moskowitz, JJ.
Cases cited
- Bush v. Bush 91 Misc 2d 389 at 391 p. 560
- Diocese of Buffalo v. McCarthy 91 AD2d 213 at 217 p. 560