Majority
In an action, inter alia, for injunctive relief and to recover damages for defamation, the defendants Angela Fox and Edward Fox appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Bruno, J.), dated June 16, 2014, as denied that branch of their motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the cause of action alleging defamation insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the cause of action alleging defamation insofar as asserted against the defendants Angela Fox and Edward Fox is granted.
The plaintiffs and the defendants Angela Fox and Edward Fox (hereinafter together the appellants) are neighbors residing in the Village of Bayville. The front of the plaintiffs’ property faces the rear of the appellants’ property. The plaintiff William Lemieux (hereinafter William) is a police officer with the Nassau County Police Department. The plaintiff Jennifer
In July 2012, the plaintiffs commenced this action against the appellants and their daughter, Carolyn Fox, who resides in California. Issue was joined in August 2012. In an order dated June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Carolyn Fox which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her. Shortly thereafter, the appellants moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The court, among other things, denied that branch of the appellants’ motion which was to dismiss the cause of action alleging defamation insofar as asserted against them, and they appeal from that portion of the order.
For the reasons stated in the companion appeal (see Lemieux v Fox, 135 AD3d 713 [2016] [decided herewith]), the cause of action alleging defamation failed to comply with the pleading requirements of CPLR 3016 (a) (see Horbul v Mercury Ins. Group, 64 AD3d 682 , 683 [2009]) and, in any event, the appellants’ communications to the police were protected by a qualified privilege (see Zapata v Tufenkjian, 123 AD3d 814 , 816 [2014]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the appellants’ motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the cause of action alleging defamation insofar as asserted against them.
The appellants’ remaining contentions either are not properly before this Court or have been rendered academic by our determination. Dillon, J.P., Chambers, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Lemieux v. Fox 135 AD3d 713 p. 716
- Horbul v. Mercury Insurance Group 64 AD3d 682 at 683 p. 716
- Zapata v. Tufenkjian 123 AD3d 814 at 816 p. 716