Majority
In an action to recover damages for breach of the terms of an insurance policy and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Toussaint, J.), dated February 11, 2015, which denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the plaintiff’s second and third causes of action.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the third cause of action, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
This case arises from a claim for supplementary uninsured/ underinsured motorist (hereinafter SUM) benefits relating to a motor vehicle accident. The complaint alleges that on February 21, 2010, the plaintiff was operating a vehicle that was insured by the defendant Government Employees Insurance Company (hereinafter GEICO), with the permission of the vehicle’s owner. The vehicle collided with a vehicle insured by Allstate Insurance Company (hereinafter Allstate), allegedly causing the plaintiff serious injuries as defined in Insurance Law § 5102 (d), and property damage. The plaintiff alleged that he would incur future medical expenses “in any effort to be cured” and would be “unable to pursue [his] usual duties with the same degree of efficiency as prior to this accident.”
Allstate tendered its policy limits of $50,000 in settlement of the plaintiff’s claim, which the plaintiff contends was insufficient to make him whole. Therefore, the plaintiff made a claim under the SUM endorsement to the GEICO policy. The plaintiff alleges that GEICO unreasonably refused to pay the claim.
GEICO moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the second and third causes of action in the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. It argued, inter alia, that if the second and third causes of action sounded in breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, that covenant was implicit in every contract, and therefore those causes of action were duplicative of the cause of action sounding in breach of contract. In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court denied GEICO’s motion on the ground, inter alia, that the second and third causes of action were not duplicative of the cause of action sounding in breach of contract.
On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the pleading is afforded a liberal construction, and the court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 , 87-88 [1994]; Caravello v One Mgt. Group, LLC, 131 AD3d 1191 [2015]). The second cause of action alleges a failure to act in good faith. Implicit in every contract is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (see Elmhurst Dairy, Inc. v Bartlett Dairy, Inc., 97 AD3d 781 , 784 [2012]). The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a pledge that neither party to the contract shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruit of the contract, even if the terms of the contract do not explicitly prohibit such conduct (see Moran v Erk, 11 NY3d 452 , 456 [2008]; 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144 , 153 [2002]; Atlas El. Corp. v United El. Group, Inc., 77 AD3d 859 , 860 [2010]). Such a cause of action is not necessarily duplicative of a cause of action alleging breach of contract (see Elmhurst Dairy, Inc. v Bartlett Dairy, Inc., 97 AD3d at 784 ).
An insurance carrier has a duty to “investigate in good faith and pay covered claims” (Bi-Economy Mkt., Inc. v Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 10 NY3d 187 , 195 [2008]). Damages for breach
However, as acknowledged by the plaintiff in his brief, the third cause of action sounds in breach of contract, and therefore, is duplicative of the first cause of action. Accordingly, that branch of GEICO’s motion which was to dismiss the third cause of action should have been granted (see Canzona v Atanasio, 118 AD3d 841 , 843 [2014]).
Leventhal, J.P., Chambers, Cohen and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Leon v. Martinez 84 NY2d 83 at 87-88 p. 976
- Caravello v. One Management Group, LLC 131 AD3d 1191 p. 976
- Elmhurst Dairy, Inc. v. Bartlett Dairy, Inc. 97 AD3d 781 at 784 p. 976
- Moran v. Erk 11 NY3d 452 at 456 p. 976
- 511 West 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co. 98 NY2d 144 at 153 p. 976
- Atlas Elevator Corp. v. United Elevator Group, Inc. 77 AD3d 859 at 860 p. 976
- Bi-Economy Market, Inc. v. Harleysville Insurance 10 NY3d 187 at 195 p. 976
- Panasia Estates, Inc. v. Hudson Insurance 10 NY3d 200 at 203 p. 977
- Michaan v. Gazebo Horticultural, Inc. 117 AD3d 692 p. 977
- Genovese v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 106 AD3d 866 at 868 p. 977
- Mutual Ass'n Administrators, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance 118 AD3d 856 p. 977
- Canzona v. Atanasio 118 AD3d 841 at 843 p. 977