Majority
Appeal from an order of the Surrogate’s Court of Fulton County (Hoye, S.), entered December 23, 2014, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to SCPA 2103, to, among other things, direct respondent to deliver certain property to decedent’s estate.
Decedent died in December 2012, and in her will she left her property to her five children in equal shares. Petitioners are three of her children; respondent is the child with whom she was living for a period of time prior to her death. Decedent’s will was admitted to probate, and petitioner Charles T. Dwyer
SCPA 2103 establishes a discovery procedure by which a fiduciary can identify and recover estate assets held by a third party (see Matter of Van Patten, 190 AD2d 322 , 326 [1993]; Margaret Valentine Turano, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 58A, SCPA 2103 at 295). The fiduciary bears the burden to prove that property held by a respondent is an estate asset; only when that obligation has been satisfied does the burden shift to the respondent to prove the proper disposition of the disputed property (see Matter of Voyiatgis, 110 AD3d 911 , 912 [2013]; Matter of Rappaport, 66 AD3d 1032 , 1032-1033 [2009]). We agree with Surrogate’s Court that petitioners did not satisfy this initial burden and failed to establish grounds for further inquiry.
First, petitioners submitted no proof whatsoever to support their claim that decedent owned or had an interest in bank deposits totaling approximately $90,000. The only substantial financial asset in which decedent was shown to have an interest was a sum of $9,000 that respondent was holding for decedent’s benefit at the time of her death. Petitioners acknowledge that these funds were duly distributed following decedent’s death.[2] This sum originated from a savings account that decedent closed in September 2009. Respondent placed these funds in her own name to protect them in the event that decedent needed long-term care, and she testified that she held them solely for decedent’s benefit. Petitioners contend that the fact that respondent admittedly placed these funds in her own name indicates that she may have also done so with other funds and used them for her own benefit. Specifically, petition
1 Petitioners also sought information about the contents of decedent’s house, but, upon appeal, raise no challenge to respondent’s assertion that the property was divided among decedent’s children. We thus deem any related claims to be abandoned (see Matter of Van Patten, 190 AD2d 322 , 325 [1993]).
2 Certain estate-related expenses were deducted before the distribution.
We reject petitioners’ contention that respondent is obliged to account for the remainder of the account balance on the ground that she held a power of attorney for decedent and therefore had a confidential relationship with her. When there are allegations of undue influence or constructive fraud, the existence of a confidential relationship in which the parties dealt on unequal terms shifts the burden to the more powerful individual to show that there was no deception or undue influence exercised (see Matter of Nealon, 104 AD3d 1088 , 1088-1089 [2013], affd 22 NY3d 1045 [2014]; Oakes v Muka, 69 AD3d 1139 , 1140-1141 [2010], appeal dismissed 15 NY3d 867 [2010]). Critically, however, in this matter, petitioners do not make any claim that decedent suffered from any physical or mental incapacity, or that she lacked the ability to manage her own affairs and exercise her own free will, and they have neither claimed nor shown any exercise of undue influence. Respondent asserts that decedent was fully financially independent and managed all of her own banking at the time that she closed the savings account; this is wholly undisputed by petitioners. There is no evidence that respondent used the power of attorney in connection with the savings account, or that it was ever used at all. In these circumstances, the mere existence of the power of attorney neither establishes that there was a confidential relationship nor shifts the burden of proof to respondent (see Matter of Bonczyk v Williams, 119 AD3d 1124 , 1127 [2014]; compare Matter of Nealon, 104 AD3d at 1089 ). Further, decedent’s September 2009 savings account balance is not subject to discovery, as the three-year limitations period applicable to any conversion claim pertaining to these funds expired before decedent died (see CPLR 201, 214 [3]; Matter of Perelman, 123 AD3d 436 , 436-437 [2014], lvs denied 25 NY3d 905 [2015]; Margaret Valentine Turano, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 58A, SCPA 2103 at 300). Accordingly, petitioners established no reasonable basis for further inquiry on this ground.
Likewise, petitioners established no grounds for inquiry
Next, petitioners assert that respondent should account for rental income due to decedent under a September 2010 lease that decedent entered into with her grandson—respondent’s son—and his wife.[3] Decedent’s bank records fail to reveal that she ever received these rent payments. However, as previously noted, petitioners have neither claimed nor shown that decedent lacked capacity to handle her financial affairs, and the record does not reveal that respondent handled any transactions relative to this lease on decedent’s behalf, nor that she was responsible for collecting the rent. Decedent signed the lease with the tenants, in which the tenants agreed to make monthly rent payments to decedent. Decedent thereafter executed lease extensions in 2011 and 2012, and, again, respondent was not a signatory. Whether decedent forgave the rent payments, or whether she collected them and made some disposition that is not reflected in her bank records, is irrevelant in the absence of any evidence that respondent ever possessed the payments or was in any manner responsible for collecting and accounting for them.
Finally, petitioners argue that further inquiry is required regarding decedent’s 2003 Buick Century automobile, which respondent asserts that decedent transferred to her as a gift in
3 Decedent had life use of the leased premises, which she and her now-deceased husband had previously conveyed to their children.
Peters, P.J., Egan Jr., Devine and Clark, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Cases cited
- In re the Estate of Van Patten 190 AD2d 322 at 326 p. 1370
- In re Voyiatgis 110 AD3d 911 at 912 p. 1370
- In re Rappaport 66 AD3d 1032 at 1032-1033 p. 1370
- In re the Estate of Nealon 104 AD3d 1088 at 1088-1089 p. 1371
- In re the Estate of Nealon 22 NY3d 1045 p. 1371
- Oakes v. Muka 69 AD3d 1139 at 1140-1141 p. 1371
- Bonczyk v. Williams 119 AD3d 1124 at 1127 p. 1371
- Perelman v. Cohen 123 AD3d 436 at 436-437 p. 1371
- In re the Estate of Graeve 113 AD3d 983 at 984-985 p. 1372
- In re the Estate of Luttrell 99 AD2d 603 at 603 p. 1373
- Deutsch v. Gel Spice Co. 134 AD3d 1110 at 1112 p. 1373