Majority
Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Barbara Jaffe, J.), entered December 22, 2014 and December 26, 2014, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted third
The motion court correctly dismissed Hudson’s contribution claims against Gilsanz, Marino, Langan, GZA, and Gordon (collectively, respondents), and Crystal’s cross claim for contribution against Gordon. Those claims are barred, because plaintiffs’ complaint seeks to recover only economic losses resulting from breach of contract (see Board of Educ. of Hudson City School Dist. v Sargent, Webster, Crenshaw & Folley, 71 NY2d 21 , 26-29 [1987]; Trump Vil. Section 3 v New York State Hous. Fin. Agency, 307 AD2d 891 , 897 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 504 [2003]; Rockefeller Univ. v Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.Y., 232 AD2d 155 , 155-156 [1st Dept 1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 811 [1997]).
Because Hudson had successfully argued on its prior summary judgment motion that plaintiffs are seeking only economic losses arising from a breach of contract, it may not now take the inconsistent position that plaintiffs are seeking other damages as well (see D & L Holdings v Goldman Co., 287 AD2d 65 , 71 [1st Dept 2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 611 [2002]). In any event, Hudson’s current argument is unavailing. Plaintiffs’ allegations that respondents negligently performed their work sound in breach of contract (see Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v Long Is. R.R. Co., 70 NY2d 382 , 389-390 [1987]; Board of Mgrs. of Soho N. 267 W. 124th St. Condominium v NW 124 LLC, 116 AD3d 506 , 507 [1st Dept 2014]).
Hudson’s argument that respondents are liable in tort because the negligent performance of their duties launched a force or instrument of harm by creating or exacerbating a dangerous condition is unavailing, as Hudson failed to demonstrate the existence of a “dangerous condition” that caused plaintiffs’ alleged injuries (see generally Espinal v
To the extent Crystal argues that it is entitled to contribution on a negligent misrepresentation theory, it never asserted such a cross claim. In any event, its claims of negligence, professional malpractice, and negligent misrepresentation all sound in breach of contract (see Board of Mgrs. of Soho N. 267 W. 124th St. Condominium, 116 AD3d at 507 ; Children’s Corner Learning Ctr. v A. Miranda Contr. Corp., 64 AD3d 318 , 323-324 [1st Dept 2009]).
We have considered the appealing parties’ remaining contentions and find them unavailing.
Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Sweeny, Gische and Kapnick, JJ.
Cases cited
- Board of Education v. Sargent, Webster, Crenshaw & Folley 71 NY2d 21 at 26-29 p. 506
- Trump Village Section 3, Inc. v. New York State Housing Finance Agency 307 AD2d 891 at 897 p. 506
- Rockefeller University v. Tishman Construction Corp. 232 AD2d 155 at 155-156 p. 506
- D & L Holdings, LLC v. RCG Goldman Co., LLC 287 AD2d 65 at 71 p. 506
- Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island Rail Road 70 NY2d 382 at 389-390 p. 506
- Board of Managers of Soho North 267 West 124th Street Condominium v. NW 124 LLC 116 AD3d 506 at 507 p. 506
- Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors, Inc. 98 NY2d 136 at 141-142 p. 507
- All American Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Andrews 96 AD3d 674 at 675 p. 507
- Children's Corner Learning Center v. A. Miranda Contracting Corp. 64 AD3d 318 at 323-324 p. 507