Majority
Defendant pleaded guilty to third-degree assault (Penal Law § 120.00 [1] [“With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury”]). Thus, he is collaterally estopped to litigate in this declaratory judgment action the issue of his intent to inflict bodily injury on the person he injured (the claimant) (see Hughes v Farrey, 30 AD3d 244 , 247 [1st Dept 2006], lv dismissed 8 NY3d 841 [2007]).
Although, as defendant argues, “accidental results may flow from intentional causes” (Slayko v Security Mut. Ins. Co., 98 NY2d 289 , 293 [2002] [internal quotation marks omitted]), defendant knew that when he hit the claimant, after flipping him over his shoulder onto the pavement, injuries could result (see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v Whiting, 53 AD3d 1033 , 1034 [4th Dept 2008], appeal withdrawn 12 NY3d 780 [2009]). The harm to the claimant was inherent in the nature of the act, although the injuries may have been more extensive than defendant intended (see Empire Ins. Co. v Miguel, 114 AD3d 539 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 908 [2014]; cf. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford v Cook, 7 NY3d 131 [2006]).
Since the acts at issue were outside the scope of coverage, timely disclaimer pursuant to Insurance Law § 3420 (d) was unnecessary (see Hough v USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 93 AD3d 405 [1st Dept 2012]).
We have considered defendant’s remaining contentions and find them unavailing.
Concur — Tom, J.P., Mazzarelli, Friedman, Richter and Kahn, JJ.
Cases cited
- Hughes v. Farrey 30 AD3d 244 at 247 p. 639
- Slayko v. Security Mutual Insurance 98 NY2d 289 at 293 p. 639
- State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Whiting 53 AD3d 1033 at 1034 p. 639
- Empire Insurance v. San Miguel 114 AD3d 539 p. 639
- Automobile Insurance v. Cook 7 NY3d 131 p. 639
- Hough v. USAA Casualty Insurance 93 AD3d 405 p. 639