Majority
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schack, J.), dated May 18, 2015, which granted the motion of the defendant Olympic Fence & Railing Co., Inc., to vacate its default in appearing for oral argument on its prior motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, and for summary judgement dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the motion of the defendant Olympic Fence & Railing Co., Inc., which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, with costs to the plaintiff.
According to the deposition testimony of the parties, on the
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries. After the completion of discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the plaintiff’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. However, the defendant failed to appear for oral argument on the administratively-adjourned return date of March 25, 2015, and the motion was marked off the calendar. On April 2, 2015, the defendant moved to vacate its default in appearing for oral argument on the ground that it had been unaware of the March 25, 2015, return date, and for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to vacate its default, and thereupon granted the branch of the motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. The plaintiff appeals.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to vacate its default in appearing on the administratively-adjourned return date of the motion. The defendant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure of its attorney to appear for oral argument on the administratively-adjourned return date, it moved expeditiously to vacate the default, and there was no evidence that the default was willful or that the plaintiff was prejudiced by the delay (see Kramarenko v New York Community Hosp., 134 AD3d 770 , 772 [2015]; Brinson v Pod, 129 AD3d 1005 , 1009 [2015]; Suede v Suede, 124 AD3d 869 , 871-872 [2015]). In addition, the defendant demonstrated a potentially meritorious position on its motion for summary judgment, warranting a decision on the merits (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Kramarenko v New York Community Hosp., 134 AD3d at 772 ; Brinson v Pod, 129 AD3d at 1008 ; Cohen v Romanoff, 83 AD3d 989 [2011]; Parker v City of New York, 272 AD2d 310 , 311 [2000]).
The Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing
Here, the defendant failed to meet its prima facie burden of establishing the forklift operator’s freedom from fault in the happening of this accident as a matter of law (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 , 853 [1985]; Palmeri v Erricola, 122 AD3d at 698 ; Cattan v Sutton, 120 AD3d 537 , 538 [2014]; Sirlin v Schreib, 117 AD3d 819 [2014]). The papers the defendant submitted in support of its motion demonstrated the existence of triable issues of fact as to whether the forklift operator failed to exercise due care before proceeding from the driveway onto the street (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1143, 1146 [a]; 1173; Palmeri v Erricola, 122 AD3d at 698 ; Espiritu v Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 AD3d at 789 ; Lugo v Brentwood Union Free School Dist., 212 AD2d 582 , 583 [1995]; Powers v Medina, 1 AD2d 727 [1955]; Thomson v Gasteiger, 199 App Div 744 [1922]). As the defendant failed to meet its prima facie burden, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s papers submitted in opposition (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d at 853 ; Palmeri v Erricola, 122 AD3d at 698 ).
Rivera, J.P., Dillon, Chambers and Dickerson, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Kramarenko v. New York Community Hospital 134 AD3d 770 at 772 p. 808
- Brinson v. Pod 129 AD3d 1005 at 1009 p. 808
- Cohen v. Romanoff 83 AD3d 989 p. 808
- Parker v. City of New York 272 AD2d 310 at 311 p. 808
- Cox v. Nunez 23 AD3d 427 p. 809
- Gezelter v. Pecora 129 AD3d 1021 at 1021-1022 p. 809
- Palmeri v. Erricola 122 AD3d 697 p. 809
- Espiritu v. Shuttle Express Coach, Inc. 115 AD3d 787 p. 809
- Winegrad v. New York University Medical Center 64 NY2d 851 at 853 p. 809
- Cattan v. Sutton 120 AD3d 537 at 538 p. 809
- Sirlin v. Schreib 117 AD3d 819 p. 809