Majority
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
A separation agreement that is not merged into a judgment of divorce is a contract subject to principles of contract interpretation (see Matter of Meccico v Meccico, 76 NY2d 822 , 823-824 [1990]; Shanon v Patterson, 38 AD3d 519 [2007]).
“[P]arties to an agreement may provide for the payment of liquidated damages upon its breach, and such damages will be upheld if (1) the amount fixed is a reasonable measure of the probable actual loss in the event of breach, and (2) the actual loss suffered is difficult to determine precisely. However, if the liquidated damages do not bear a reasonable proportion to the loss actually sustained by a breach, they will constitute an unenforceable penalty” (Willner v Willner, 145 AD2d 236 , 239-240 [1989] [citations omitted]; see Zervakis v Kyreakedes, 257 AD2d 619 , 620 [1999]).
Here, the parties entered into a separation agreement dated April 20, 2012, which was incorporated but not merged into the judgment of divorce. In relevant part, the agreement provided that, in consideration of the defendant’s agreement to pay 100% of the costs associated with maintaining the marital residence (in which the plaintiff and the parties’ four children continued to reside), the defendant would pay $1,500 per month in child support until the date of the sale of the marital residence, and $5,076.29 per month thereafter. However, if at any time prior to the sale of the marital residence, the defendant was not in compliance with “all of the terms” of the agreement, then his child support obligation would be increased to $5,076.29 per month.
Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the subject provision, as drafted, constituted an unenforceable penalty clause (see Zervakis v Kyreakedes, 257 AD2d at 620 ; Willner v Willner, 145 AD2d at
With respect to the plaintiffs claim for arrears referable to summer camp expenses, the plaintiff offered insufficient evidence that such expenses were actually incurred. Accordingly, she was not entitled to a money judgment therefor (see Boris v Boris, 272 AD2d 284 , 285 [2000]; Carella v Carella, 106 AD2d 601 , 603 [1984]).
Chambers, J.P., Dickerson, Hinds-Radix and LaSalle, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Meccico v. Meccico 76 NY2d 822 at 823-824 p. 1003
- Shanon v. Patterson 38 AD3d 519 p. 1003
- Willner v. Willner 145 AD2d 236 at 239-240 p. 1003
- Zervakis v. Kyreakedes 257 AD2d 619 at 620 p. 1003
- Boris v. Boris 272 AD2d 284 at 285 p. 1004
- Cabella v. Cabella 106 AD2d 601 at 603 p. 1004