Majority
Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Tompkins County (Cassidy, J.), entered February 10, 2015, which, among other things, granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 6, to modify a prior order of custody.
Petitioner (hereinafter the mother) and respondent (hereinafter the father) are the unwed parents of a daughter (born in 2005). Pursuant to a February 2011 order made on consent, the parties shared joint legal and physical custody of the child. In March 2014, the child informed the mother that, while she was visiting the father’s home, her older half sisters who live with the father had caused a painful injury to her vaginal area. Within days, the mother commenced a modification proceeding seeking sole legal and physical custody of the child. Family Court thereafter granted temporary sole custody to the mother, prompting the father to file his own modification petition, in which he also sought sole custody of the child. The father also filed a sworn letter concerning the child’s visitation with his other children — the child’s half siblings and stepsihlings— which Family Court deemed a petition for visitation and appointed an attorney for these children. After a fact-finding hearing on the underlying petitions, as well a Lincoln hearing for the child, but not for the siblings, Family Court, among other things, awarded sole legal and physical custody of the child to the mother and granted the father three hours of visitation each Wednesday. The father now appeals.
The father’s central argument is that the mother failed to establish a change in circumstances since the entry of the 2011
At the fact-finding hearing, the mother, the child’s school teacher and a Tompkins County Department of Social Services caseworker all testified that, in March 2014, the child told them that, while she was at the father’s residence, her older half sisters touched and pinched her vaginal area, causing her significant pain. The child was later diagnosed with a labial adhesion, which the caseworker believed to be the result of the half sisters’ actions. The caseworker further testified that, when she first notified the father of the child’s complaints and diagnosis, “[h]e denied that his children would ever touch each other’s privates in any way whatsoever.” And, indeed, when asked about the incident at the fact-finding hearing, the father remained steadfast in his refusal to acknowledge the alleged touching as a possible cause of the child’s injury. The record additionally reveals that, in January 2014, the father was terminated from his job for sexual harassment, and that he currently relies exclusively on public assistance to support the child, as well as his current wife, their six additional children and their 11 pets, all of whom live together in the same single-wide trailer. Based upon the foregoing evidence, we find that the mother established a change in circumstances warranting a best interests analysis (see Matter of Klee v Schill, 95 AD3d 1599 , 1600-1601 [2012]; Matter of Starkey v Ferguson, 80 AD3d 799 , 801 [2011]). We also find support for Family Court’s determination that joint custody is no longer feasible due to the father’s frequent inability to communicate effectively and work cooperatively with the mother for the good of the child— especially in regard to her medical care — which, in and of itself, amounts to a change in circumstances (see Matter of Colleen GG. v Richard HH., 135 AD3d 1005 , 1007 [2016]; Matter of Schlegel v Kropf, 132 AD3d at 1182 ).
As to the best interests analysis, the father’s brief raises no issue with Family Court’s determination that the mother was better equipped to meet the child’s needs and, thus, any argu
The father’s remaining argument that Family Court committed reversible error by failing to hold Lincoln hearings for the child’s half siblings and stepsiblings is without merit. There is no legal requirement that the court order in camera hearings for non-subject children whose preferences are merely ancillary to the resolution of a custody dispute, and with whom the subject child has never resided on a full-time basis (see generally Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167 , 169-170, 173 [1982]; Matter of Lincoln v Lincoln, 24 NY2d 270 , 271-272 [1969]; Matter of Jessica B. v Robert B., 104 AD3d 1077 , 1077-1078 [2013]).
Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy, Garry and Mulvey, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.
Cases cited
- Schlegel v. Kropf 132 AD3d 1181 at 1182 p. 1137
- Knox v. Romano 137 AD3d 1530 at 1531 p. 1137
- Cornick v. Floreno 130 AD3d 1170 at 1171 p. 1137
- Demers v. McLear 130 AD3d 1259 at 1260 p. 1137
- Klee v. Schill 95 AD3d 1599 at 1600-1601 p. 1137
- Colleen GG. v. Richard HH. 135 AD3d 1005 at 1007 p. 1137
- In re Garrasi 104 AD3d 990 at 991 p. 1138
- In re Alexis AA. 91 AD3d 1073 at 1073 p. 1138
- Hartjen v. Hartjen 132 AD3d 1172 at 1173 p. 1138
- Festa v. Dempsey 110 AD3d 1162 at 1163 p. 1138
- Eschbach v. Eschbach 56 NY2d 167 at 169-170, 173 p. 1138
- Lincoln v. Lincoln 24 NY2d 270 at 271-272 p. 1138
- Jessica B. ex rel. Joseph B. v. Robert B. 104 AD3d 1077 at 1077-1078 p. 1138