Majority
Appeal from an order of the County Court of Franklin County (Main Jr., J.), entered February 19, 2015, which classified defendant as a risk level three sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.
Defendant pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the first degree stemming from his sexual contact with a seven-year-old girl, and he was sentenced to a prison term of seven years followed by 10 years of postrelease supervision. Prior to his release from prison, the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders prepared a risk assessment instrument that presumptively classified defendant as a risk level two sexually violent offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C). However, the Board and the People recommended an upward departure to a risk level three. Following a hearing, County Court determined that an upward departure was warranted and thereafter classified defendant as a risk level three sexually violent offender. Defendant now appeals.
We affirm. An “[u]pward departure from the presumptive risk level is justified when an aggravating factor, not adequately taken into account by the risk assessment guidelines, is established by clear and convincing evidence” (People v Auleta, 135 AD3d 1251 , 1252 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). In rendering such a determination, County Court “may consider reliable hearsay evidence such as the case summary, presentence investigation report and risk assessment instrument” (People v Nash, 114 AD3d 1008 , 1008 [2014]; see People v Becker, 120 AD3d 846 , 847 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 908 [2014]). Where the nature of the conduct underlying the conviction is not adequately accounted for in the risk assessment instrument, it may form the basis for an upward modification of a defendant’s risk level (see People v Nash, 114 AD3d at 1008 ; People v Greene, 83 AD3d 1304 , 1304 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 706 [2011]).
Here, information in the case summary and presentence
Peters, P.J., Garry, Clark and Aarons, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.
Cases cited
- People v. Auleta 135 AD3d 1251 at 1252 p. 1282
- People v. Nash 114 AD3d 1008 at 1008 p. 1282
- People v. Becker 120 AD3d 846 at 847 p. 1282
- People v. Rowe 136 AD3d 1125 at 1126 p. 1283
- People v. O'Connell 95 AD3d 1460 at 1460-1461 p. 1283
- People v. Wasley 73 AD3d 1400 at 1400-1401 p. 1283