Majority
Appeal from stated portions of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lawrence H. Ecker, J.), dated September 11, 2014. The judgment, upon an amended decision of that court dated July 14, 2014, made after a nonjury trial, inter alia, imputed income to the defendant in the sum of $43,750 per year, failed to award child support to the defendant, directed the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of one-half the value of his Jeep vehicle, and awarded the defendant an attorney’s fee in the sum of only $12,500.
“A court need not rely upon a party’s own account of his or her finances, but may impute income based upon the party’s past income or demonstrated future potential earnings” (Sotnik v Zavilyansky, 101 AD3d 1102 , 1103 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bauman v Bauman, 132 AD3d 791 , 793 [2015]; Greisman v Greisman, 98 AD3d 1079 , 1080 [2012]; Haagen-Islami v Islami, 96 AD3d 1004 , 1005 [2012]). Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in imputing income to the defendant in the sum of $43,750 per year based upon, inter alia, his skills, education, and employment history.
Further, under the circumstances of this case, including the parties’ shared custody arrangement, the Supreme Court properly determined that the defendant was not entitled to receive child support from the plaintiff (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b]; Bast v Rossoff, 91 NY2d 723 [1998]; Matter of Cassano v Cassano, 85 NY2d 649 [1995]; Ochs v Ochs, 40 AD3d 1061 , 1062 [2007]).
The determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee is within the Supreme Court’s discretion (see Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]; DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879 , 881 [1987]; Duffy v Duffy, 84 AD3d 1151 , 1152-1153 [2011]; Kaplan v Kaplan, 51 AD3d 635 , 637 [2008]). In exercising its discretion, a court should review the financial circumstances of both parties together with all the other circumstances of the case, which may include the relative merit of the parties’ position (see DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d at 881 ). Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the defendant an attorney’s fee in the sum of only $12,500.
However, as properly conceded by the plaintiff, the parties stipulated that each would retain his or her own vehicle. Thus, the Supreme Court should not have directed the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of one-half the value of his Jeep vehicle (see generally Pachomski v Pachomski, 32 AD3d 1005 , 1006 [2006]).
The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit.
Mastro, J.R, Rivera, Austin and LaSalle, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Sotnik v. Zavilyansky 101 AD3d 1102 at 1103 p. 996
- Bauman v. Bauman 132 AD3d 791 at 793 p. 996
- Greisman v. Greisman 98 AD3d 1079 at 1080 p. 996
- Haagen-Islami v. Islami 96 AD3d 1004 at 1005 p. 996
- Bast v. Rossoff 91 NY2d 723 p. 996
- Cassano v. Cassano 85 NY2d 649 p. 996
- Ochs v. Ochs 40 AD3d 1061 at 1062 p. 996
- DeCabrera v. Cabrera-Rosete 70 NY2d 879 at 881 p. 996
- Duffy v. Duffy 84 AD3d 1151 at 1152-1153 p. 996
- Pachomski v. Pachomski 32 AD3d 1005 at 1006 p. 996