Majority
Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Albany County (Kushner, J.), entered November 26, 2014, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 5, to adjudicate petitioner as the father of a child born to respondent Amanda O.
In 2003, while respondent Amanda O. (hereinafter the mother) was in a relationship with respondent William R, she engaged in sexual intercourse with petitioner. In late 2003, the mother gave birth to a daughter and William R signed an acknowledgment of paternity, thus establishing the paternity and liability for support of the child (see Family Ct Act § 516-a). Nearly three years later, petitioner and the mother met again and, upon seeing the child, petitioner believed that there was a resemblance between them. A subsequent DNA test revealed that he was the child’s biological father. In August 2008, petitioner filed a petition for paternity. Family Court
A petitioner who did not sign an acknowledgment of paternity does not have standing to challenge paternity pursuant to Family Ct Act § 516-a (see Matter of Marquis B. v Rason B., 94 AD3d 883 , 883 [2012], lv dismissed 19 NY3d 991 [2012]). Where, as here, a petitioner claims to be the father, however, he will have standing to challenge paternity pursuant to Family Ct Act § 522 (see id.; Matter of Dwayne J.B. v Santos H., 89 AD3d 838 , 838 [2011]). The doctrine of equitable estoppel is an available defense in a paternity proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act § 522 (see Matter of Edward WW. v Diana XX., 79 AD3d 1181 , 1182 [2010]; Matter of Kristen D. v Stephen D., 280 AD2d 717 , 719 [2001]). Accordingly, “[e]stoppel may . . . preclude a man who claims to be a child’s biological father from asserting his paternity when he acquiesced in the establishment of a strong parent-child bond between the child and another man” (Matter of Shondel J. v Mark D., 7 NY3d 320 , 327 [2006]). “A motion asserting equitable estoppel may be granted on the papers, without a hearing, if Family Court possesses sufficient information to render an informed decision consistent with the child’s best interests” (Matter of Edward WW. v Diana XX., 79 AD3d at 1182 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]).
Here, the record confirms that, in 2008, Family Court considered the issue presented to be whether petitioner had grounds to challenge William P.’s acknowledgment of paternity pursuant to Family Ct Act § 516-a and found that petitioner did not have the “right to challenge the validity of the acknowledgment as he was not a signator.” While the court did outline the allegations set forth in the affidavits submitted by petitioner and William P, it determined that it would not “address the issue of ‘equitable estoppel’ as [it] cannot be reached . . . by [petitioner], a person who is not a parent or a signator to the acknowledgment of paternity.”
Generally, the doctrine of res judicata “ ‘gives binding effect to the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction and prevents the parties to an action, and those in privity with
Lahtinen, J.P., Rose, Clark and Aarons, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, and matter remitted to the Family Court of Albany County for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s decision.
Cases cited
- People ex rel. Borrell v. New York State Board of Parole 19 NY3d 991 p. 1224
- Edward WW. v. Diana XX. 79 AD3d 1181 at 1182 p. 1224
- Shondel J. v. Mark D. 7 NY3d 320 at 327 p. 1224
- Landau, P.C. v. LaRossa, Mitchell & Ross 11 NY3d 8 at 13 p. 1225
- In re the Accounting of Raftery 309 NY 605 at 616 p. 1225
- Caliguri v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. 121 AD3d 1030 at 1031 p. 1225
- Jackson v. Jamaica Hospital Medical Center 61 AD3d 1166 at 1167-1168 p. 1225