Majority
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for wrongful death, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Baynes, J.), dated June 13, 2014, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
Muriel Enita Holloway (hereinafter the decedent), who suffered from kidney failure, collapsed in the bedroom of her Brooklyn apartment in a pool of blood she lost via a shunt in
The plaintiffs, the decedent’s sons, individually and on behalf of the decedent’s estate, commenced this action against the defendant, the City of New York, to recover damages for, inter alia, wrongful death. The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Supreme Court denied the motion.
“When a municipality provides ambulance service by emergency medical technicians in response to a 911 call for assistance, it performs a governmental function and cannot be held liable unless it owed a ‘special duty’ to the injured party” (Applewhite v Accuhealth, Inc., 21 NY3d 420 , 423-424 [2013]). Such a special duty can arise, as relevant here, where “the government entity voluntarily assumed a duty to the plaintiff beyond what was owed to the public generally” {id. at 426), that is, where the municipality “voluntarily assumed a ‘special
Here, the defendant demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint by establishing that no special relationship existed between it and the decedent (see Earle v Village of Lindenhurst, 130 AD3d 973 , 974 [2015]; Torres v City of New York, 116 AD3d 947 , 947-948 [2014]; Kupferstein v City of New York, 101 AD3d 952 , 954 [2012]). The defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the firefighters did not assume an affirmative duty to act on the decedent’s behalf, and, in opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Bawa v City of New York, 94 AD3d 926 , 928 [2012]). Moreover, even assuming that the 911 operator’s assurance that an ambulance was on its way constituted an assumption by the defendant of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the decedent, the defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the decedent and the plaintiffs did not rely to their detriment on that assurance. In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The record does not show that the plaintiffs were lulled by any assurance made by the 911 operator into a false sense of security that caused them “to forego other available avenues of protection” (Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d at 261 ).
Accordingly, no question of fact exists regarding whether the decedent or the plaintiffs justifiably relied upon any affirmative undertaking by the defendant, and the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Kirchberger v Senisi, 122 AD3d 804 , 805 [2014]).
Leventhal, J.P., Hall, Austin and Bar-ros, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Applewhite v. Accuhealth, Inc. 21 NY3d 420 at 423-424 p. 689
- Laratro v. City of New York 8 NY3d 79 at 82 p. 690
- Cuffy v. City of New York 69 NY2d 255 at 260 p. 690
- Earle v. Village of Lindenhurst 130 AD3d 973 at 974 p. 690
- Torres v. City of New York 116 AD3d 947 at 947-948 p. 690
- Bawa v. City of New York 94 AD3d 926 at 928 p. 690
- Kirchberger v. Senisi 122 AD3d 804 at 805 p. 690