Majority
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (McGuire, J.), entered March 26, 2015 in Sullivan County, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
During the 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 school years, plaintiff Anthony Motta Jr., a student at Eldred Junior-Senior High School, was subjected to harassment and bullying by several classmates, who called him disparaging epithets, urinated on him, damaged or otherwise snatched his belongings and engaged in physical altercations with him. On several occasions, the school principal, a guidance counselor and a school security guard were notified of the bullying and some remedial action was taken; the bullying allegedly continued. The harassment and bullying allegedly had a negative effect on, among other things, Motta’s academic performance, requiring him to repeat ninth grade, as well as his behavior in that he engaged
Plaintiffs commenced this action against defendant alleging that Motta sustained physical, mental and emotional injuries as a result of defendant’s negligent supervision of its students and its violation of the Dignity for All Students Act (Education Law § 10 et seq. [hereinafter DASA]). Following joinder of issue, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Supreme Court, finding that DASA does not create a private right of action and that defendant was not deliberately indifferent to the incidences between Motta and his classmates, granted the motion. This appeal by plaintiffs ensued.
Initially, we find no reason to disturb Supreme Court’s finding that DASA does not provide for a private right of action. There is no explicit private right of action in the statutory scheme nor can one be implied from the statutory language and the legislative history (see Education Law § 10 et seq.; Carrier v Salvation Army, 88 NY2d 298 , 302 [1996]; Ovitz v Bloomberg L.P., 77 AD3d 515 , 516 [2010], affd 18 NY3d 753 [2012]; Gandler v City of New York, 57 AD3d 324 , 325 [2008]). DASA is intended to create and implement school board policies in order to “afford all students in public schools an environment free of discrimination and harassment” caused by incidents of “bullying, taunting or intimidation” (Education Law § 10) “through the appropriate training of personnel, mandatory instruction for students on civility and tolerance, and reporting requirements” (People v Marquan M., 24 NY3d 1 , 4 [2014]; see Education Law § 13). To imply a private right of action would not further the legislative purpose or comport with the statutory scheme.
Turning to the negligent supervision cause of action, we find that the allegations in the complaint are more appropriately analyzed under the standard set forth in Mirand v City of New York ( 84 NY2d 44 , 49 [1994]), rather than the “deliberate indifference” standard — utilized by Supreme Court — which is applicable to claims arising out of violations of federal law. “Schools are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision” {id. [citations omitted]; see Rose v Onteora Cent. School Dist., 52 AD3d 1161 , 1162 [2008]). “In that regard, a school district is held to the same degree of care as would a reasonably prudent parent placed in comparable circumstances” (Hofmann v
There is no dispute that, beginning in 2011, defendant had actual knowledge of the numerous conflicts between Motta and his classmates. In support of its summary judgment motion, defendant submitted the affidavits of the school principal and a guidance counselor, as well as their deposition testimony, indicating that they investigated, reported and addressed all incidents of which they were made aware and resolved those conflicts through discipline of the identified student, mediation, directives to Motta’s teachers and a change in class schedules to keep Motta and the identified classmates separated when possible. This evidence, and the deposition testimony of the school security officer, further indicated that not all incidents were reported by Motta to school officials despite being advised to do so, and that many of the investigations into Motta’s complaints concluded that Motta also engaged in harassing and violent conduct with the other students. In response, plaintiffs submitted affidavits from Motta and plaintiff Christine Horne, Motta’s mother, as well as other evidence setting forth specific incidents of harassment and bullying reported to school administrators that continued even after remedial measures were taken by defendant. These affidavits noted specific occasions where defendant’s response to Motta’s complaints of bullying appeared inadequate and, at times, met with inappropriate responses and the blame was placed on Motta. Plaintiffs also alleged the detrimental impact that defendant’s failure to adequately address the bullying had
Garry, J.P., Egan Jr., Lynch and Devine, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and motion denied.
Cases cited
- Carrier v. Salvation Army 88 NY2d 298 at 302 p. 820
- Ovitz v. Bloomberg L.P. 77 AD3d 515 at 516 p. 820
- Ovitz v. Bloomberg L.P. 18 NY3d 753 p. 820
- Gandler v. City of New York 57 AD3d 324 at 325 p. 820
- People v. Marquan M. 24 NY3d 1 at 4 p. 820
- Mirand v. City of New York 84 NY2d 44 at 49 p. 820
- Rose v. Onteora Central School District 52 AD3d 1161 at 1162 p. 820
- Hofmann v. Coxsackie-Athens Central School District 70 AD3d 1116 at 1117 p. 821
- Mathis v. Board of Education 126 AD3d 951 at 952 p. 821
- Wilson v. Vestal Central School District 34 AD3d 999 at 1000 p. 821
- Wood v. Watervliet City School District 30 AD3d 663 at 664 p. 821
- Oakes v. Massena Central School District 19 AD3d 981 at 982 p. 821