Majority
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Administrative Appeals Board dated December 30, 2014, affirming a determination of an administrative law judge dated January 22, 2014, which, after a hearing, found that the petitioner had refused to submit to a chemical test in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194, and revoked her driver license.
Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Administrative Appeals Board properly refused to consider the petitioner’s hospital records since they were not submitted to or considered by the administrative law judge at the hearing (see 15 NYCRR 155.4; Matter of Tornheim v Appeals Bd. of N.Y. State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 82 AD3d 1253 [2011]). Moreover, the petitioner failed to show that the records were newly discovered evidence unavailable at the time of the hearing, and could not have been obtained in the exercise of due diligence (see Matter of Morrissey v Sobol, 176 AD2d 1147 [1991]). Despite her awareness of these records prior to the hearing, the petitioner neither sought an adjournment of the hearing for the purpose of obtaining them (see 15 NYCRR 127.7), nor attempted to subpoena those records (see 15 NYCRR 127.11 [b]; CPLR 2302).
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the fact that a chemical test was eventually performed at the hospital does not “suffice to undo” her prior chemical test refusal (see Matter of Nicol v Grant, 117 AD2d 940 , 941 [1986]; Matter of O’Brien v Melton, 61 AD2d 1091 [1978]). We also reject the petitioner’s contention that her “altered state” rendered her incapable of a chemical test refusal. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (2) does not require a knowing refusal by the petitioner. The petitioner’s interpretation of the statute “would lead to the absurd result that the greater the degree of intoxication of an automobile driver, the less the degree of his [or her] accountability” (Matter of Carey v Melton, 64 AD2d 983 , 983 [1978]; see People v Kates, 53 NY2d 591 , 596 [1981]). Mastro,
J.R, Hall, Sgroi and Barros, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Morrissey v. Sobol 176 AD2d 1147 p. 668
- Kelly v. Safir 96 NY2d 32 at 38 p. 669
- Pell v. Board of Education 34 NY2d 222 at 231 p. 669
- Mannino v. Department of Motor Vehicles 101 AD3d 880 p. 669
- Hildreth v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Appeals Board 83 AD3d 838 at 839 p. 669
- Sharf v. New York State Department of Motor Vehicles 74 AD3d 978 p. 669
- Peeso v. Fiala 130 AD3d 1442 at 1443 p. 669
- Nicol v. Grant 117 AD2d 940 at 941 p. 669
- People v. Kates 53 NY2d 591 at 596 p. 669