In re Merinda MM.

Appeal from a corrected order of the Family Court of Broome County (Connerton, J.), entered August 14, 2015, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b, to adjudicate the subject child to be permanently neglected, and terminated respondents’ parental rights.

Respondent Carl MM. (hereinafter the father) and respondent Sirena NN. (hereinafter the mother) are the parents of a daughter (born in 2012). The child was removed from respondents’ care two weeks after her birth on the basis that, in violation of a safety contract agreed to by petitioner and respondents, the father and the child were residing with the mother, a registered sex offender who had been convicted of sexually abusing one of her older children, and that the father had permitted the mother unsupervised contact with the child. The child was subsequently adjudicated to have been neglected by respondents and, in April 2014, petitioner commenced this proceeding against respondents seeking adjudications of permanent neglect and termination of their parental rights. Following respondents’ admissions of permanent neglect and a dispositional hearing, Family Court adjudicated the child to be permanently neglected and terminated respondents’ parental rights. Respondents separately appeal, each arguing that Family Court should have imposed the alternative disposition of a suspended judgment.

We affirm. The singular inquiry in a dispositional hearing following an adjudication of permanent neglect is which disposition relating to the child’s future care and custody is in his or her best interests; there is no presumption that any particular disposition will promote such interests (see Family Ct Act § 631; Matter of Kayden E. [Luis E.], 111 AD3d 1094 , 1098 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 862 [2014]; Matter of Kellcie NN. [Sarah NN.], 85 AD3d 1251 , 1252 [2011]). Family Court may, in its discretion, commit guardianship and custody of the child to the petitioning agency or issue a suspended judgment, which provides a parent with “a brief grace period within which to become a fit parent with whom the child can be safely reunited” (Matter of Hazel OO. [Roseanne OO.], 133 AD3d 1126 , 1127 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Family Ct Act § 631 [b], [c]; Matter of Kayden E. [Luis E.], 111 AD3d at 1098 ).

With respect to the father, there was no evidence of a demonstrated ability to serve as a protective ally for the child. The father twice participated in Protective Allies for Children’s Education, a program that seeks to educate nonoffenders of the risks of being romantically involved with sex offenders and how to protect children from sexual abuse at the hands of those offenders. Despite his participation, the program’s administrators reported that the father did not derive any benefit from the program. The father acknowledged the mother’s status as a sex offender, yet resisted petitioner’s repeated directions to establish a separate residence from the mother. When the father later claimed to have established a separate residence, numerous unannounced visits cast doubt on that claim. Additionally, the father allowed the mother and her son — another known sex offender — to have unsupervised contact with his other children. While the father eventually acknowledged the risks that the mother posed to the child, there was no proof

Peters, P.J., McCarthy, Lynch and Rose, JJ., concur. Ordered that the corrected order is affirmed, without costs.