Majority
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Silber, J.), dated November 5, 2015, which granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability is denied.
The plaintiffs alleged that on February 16, 2014, their vehicle was struck in the rear by the defendant’s vehicle at the end of a Sprain Brook Parkway exit ramp, where it merged with the right travel lane of southbound Central Avenue, in Yonkers. Subsequently, the plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendant to recover damages for personal injuries. After issue was joined, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The Supreme Court granted the motion. We reverse.
“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, a plaintiff must establish, prima facie, not only that the opposing party was negligent, but also that the plaintiff was free from comparative fault” (Phillip v D&D Carting Co., Inc., 136 AD3d 18 , 22 [2015]; see Bowen v Farrell, 140 AD3d 1001 , 1002 [2016]; McLaughlin v Lunn, 137 AD3d 757 [2016]; Matos v Tai, 124 AD3d 848 [2015]; France Herly Bien-Aime v Clare, 124 AD3d 814 , 814 [2015]; Adams v Bruno, 124 AD3d 566 [2015]). A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, requiring that operator to come forward with evidence of a nonnegligent explanation for the collision in order to rebut the inference of negligence (see Tutrani v County of Suffolk, 10 NY3d 906 , 908 [2008]; Cortese v Pobejimov, 136 AD3d 635 , 636 [2016]; Brothers v Bartling,
Since the plaintiffs failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, their motion for summary judgment should have been denied, regardless of the sufficiency of the defendant’s papers in opposition (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 , 853 [1985]).
Rivera, J.R, Chambers, Roman and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Phillip v. D&D Carting Co. 136 AD3d 18 at 22, at 24 p. 680, p. 681
- Bowen v. Farrell 140 AD3d 1001 at 1002 p. 680
- McLaughlin v. Lunn 137 AD3d 757 p. 680
- Bien-Aime v. Clare 124 AD3d 814 at 814 p. 680
- Adams v. Bruno 124 AD3d 566 p. 680
- Cortese v. Pobejimov 136 AD3d 635 at 636 p. 680
- Brothers v. Bartling 130 AD3d 554 at 555 p. 681
- Whelan v. Sutherland 128 AD3d 1055 at 1056 p. 681
- Drakh v. Levin 123 AD3d 1084 at 1085 p. 681
- Winegrad v. New York University Medical Center 64 NY2d 851 at 853 p. 681