Majority
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Wade, J.), dated March 1, 2016, which denied its motion for summary judgment on the complaint and for an order of reference.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint and for an order of reference is granted.
The plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose a mortgage. The plaintiff appeals from an order denying its motion for summary judgment on the complaint and for an order of reference.
Here, in support of its motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted the mortgage, the unpaid note, and evidence of default. In addition, with respect to standing, the plaintiff submitted the affidavit of Natasha Stringer, who was employed by the plaintiff as a business operations analyst. Based on some of the plaintiff’s business records, which were attached to the affidavit, Stringer asserted that the plaintiff had been in physical possession of the underlying note, which had been endorsed to it, since June 10, 2008, long before the commencement of this action in October 2014. Stringer further asserted that she was personally familiar with the plaintiff’s record-keeping practices and procedures, the records were made in the regular course of business, it was the regular course of the plaintiff’s business to make them, and the records were made at or near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth in the records. This was sufficient to establish, prima facie, that the plaintiff was the holder of the note at the time the action was commenced (see CPLR 4518 [a]; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Taylor, 25 NY3d 355 , 359-362 [2015]; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Naughton, 137 AD3d 1199 , 1200 [2016]; Citimortgage, Inc. v Espinal, 134 AD3d 876 , 877-878 [2015]). Contrary to the contention of the defendant Gareth P. McKinney, in order to meet its prima facie burden, the plaintiff was not required to submit proof that the person who endorsed the subject note to the plaintiff on behalf of the original lender was authorized to do so. A signature on a negotiable instrument “is presumed to be genuine or authorized” (UCC 3-307 [1] [b]; see In re
Chambers, J.R, Dickerson, Duffy and Connolly, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- North American Savings Bank, FSB v. Esposito-Como 141 AD3d 706 at 708 p. 1074
- Plaza Equities, LLC v. Lamberti 118 AD3d 688 at 689 p. 1074
- Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Mendoza 139 AD3d 898 at 899 p. 1074
- U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Collymore 68 AD3d 752 at 754 p. 1074
- Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Taylor 25 NY3d 355 at 359-362 p. 1074
- Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Naughton 137 AD3d 1199 at 1200 p. 1074
- Citimortgage, Inc. v. Espinal 134 AD3d 876 at 877-878 p. 1074