Majority
Appeal from a judgment of the Ontario County Court (Frederick G. Reed, A.J.), rendered October 30, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon her plea of guilty, of falsifying business records in the first degree (two counts) and petit larceny (two counts).
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her, upon her plea of guilty, of two felony counts of falsifying business records in the first degree (Penal Law § 175.10), and two misdemeanor counts of petit larceny (§ 155.25). Contrary to defendant’s contention, the record establishes that
Defendant further contends that the court erred in refusing to suppress her statement to the police because she was questioned in a secured office complex and was never given her Miranda rights. That contention does not survive the valid waiver of the right to appeal (see People v Kemp, 94 NY2d 831 , 833 [1999]; People v Carpenter, 13 AD3d 1193 , 1193 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 797 [2005]).
Defendant contends that she did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter her plea of guilty inasmuch as the court failed to ensure that she had a full understanding of her plea as evidenced by her “yes” or “no” answers and lack of narrative responses. That contention, however, is a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the plea allocution and thus “is encompassed by [the] valid waiver of the right to appeal” (Kosty, 122 AD3d at 1408 ; see People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1 , 10 [1989]; Irvine, 42 AD3d at 950 ).
Defendant also contends that she “substantially complied” with the terms and conditions of her interim probation and that the court therefore should have permitted her, in accordance with her plea agreement, to withdraw her guilty plea with respect to the two felony counts. That contention is without merit (see People v Gibson, 52 AD3d 1227 , 1227 [2008]). At the time of the plea, the court conditioned vacatur of that part of the guilty plea covering the two felony counts upon, inter alia, defendant’s successful completion of interim probation. It is undisputed, however, that defendant failed to complete interim probation successfully. We conclude that the
Finally, defendant contends that the bargained-for sentence is unduly harsh and severe. We note that the court indicated at the time of sentencing that defendant could appeal the sentence. We nevertheless conclude that the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.
Present—Centra, J.P., Lindley, Cur-ran, Troutman and Scudder, JJ.
Cases cited
- People v. Ripley 94 AD3d 1554 at 1554 p. 1492
- People ex rel. Blake v. Pataki 13 NY3d 912 p. 1492
- People v. Lopez 6 NY3d 248 at 256 p. 1492
- People v. Kosty 122 AD3d 1408 at 1408 p. 1492
- People v. Irvine 42 AD3d 949 at 949-950 p. 1492
- People v. Kemp 94 NY2d 831 at 833 p. 1492
- People v. Carpenter 13 AD3d 1193 at 1193 p. 1492
- People v. Seaberg 74 NY2d 1 at 10 p. 1492
- People v. Gibson 52 AD3d 1227 at 1227 p. 1492
- People v. Rollins 50 AD3d 1535 at 1536 p. 1493
- People v. Wissert 85 AD3d 1633 at 1633-1634 p. 1493