Majority
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the third-party defendant/second third-party defendant, Gilmar Design Corporation, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lewis, J.), dated April 17, 2015, which denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) and CPLR
Ordered that the order dated April 17, 2015, is affirmed, with one bill of costs payable to the defendants/third-party plaintiffs-respondents and the defendant/second third-party plaintiff-respondent appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The Supreme Court properly denied the motion of the third-party defendant/second third-party defendant, Gilmar Design Corporation (hereinafter Gilmar) to vacate the orders granting the motion of the defendants/third-party plaintiffs, Exxonmobil Oil Corporation and Roux Associates, Inc. (hereinafter together Exxon), and the separate motion of the defendant/second third-party plaintiff, Soilsolution Industries, Inc. (hereinafter Soilsolution), for leave to enter judgments against it upon its failure to appear or serve answers to the third-party complaint and second third-party complaint, respectively. The record demonstrates that the address on file for Gilmar with the Secretary of State had not been updated for a period of at least three years (see Hidalgo v Cruiser Taxi Corp., 101 AD3d 950 [2012]; Fatima v Twenty Seven-Twenty Four Realty Corp., 53 AD3d 564 [2008]; J & S Constr. of NY, Inc. v 321 Bowery LLC, 39 AD3d 391 [2007]; Franklin v 172 Aububon Corp., 32 AD3d 454 [2006]). Under these circumstances, Gilmar failed to establish a reasonable excuse for its failure to keep the Secretary of State apprised of its current address for the forwarding of process (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Schacker Real Estate Corp. v 553 Burnside Ave., LLC, 133 AD3d 586 , 587 [2015]; Sussman v Jo-Sta Realty Corp., 99 AD3d 787 [2012]; Bontempts v Aude Constr. Corp., 98 AD3d 1071 , 1072 [2012]). Additionally, Gilmar lacked potentially meritorious defenses to the third-party actions, as required for vacatur under both CPLR 5015 (a) (1) and 317 (see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138 , 141 [1986]; NYCTL 2005-A Trust v 2137-2153 Nostrand Ave. Assoc., L.P., 69 AD3d 697 , 698 [2010]; Santiago v Sansue Realty Corp., 243 AD2d 622 , 623 [1997]; Paul Conte Cadillac v C.A.R.S. Purch. Serv., 126 AD2d 621 , 622-623 [1987]).
Gilmar’s remaining contention is without merit.
Rivera, J.P., Dickerson, Maltese and Connolly, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Hidalgo v. Cruiser Taxi Corp. 101 AD3d 950 p. 671
- Fatima v. Twenty Seven-Twenty Four Realty Corp. 53 AD3d 564 p. 671
- J & S Construction of NY, Inc. v. 321 Bowery LLC 39 AD3d 391 p. 671
- Sean v. 172 Aububon Corp. 32 AD3d 454 p. 671
- Schacker Real Estate Corp. v. 553 Burnside Avenue, LLC 133 AD3d 586 at 587 p. 671
- Sussman v. Jo-Sta Realty Corp. 99 AD3d 787 p. 671
- Bontempts v. Aude Construction Corp. 98 AD3d 1071 at 1072 p. 671
- Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v. A. C. Dutton Lumber Co. 67 NY2d 138 at 141 p. 671
- NYCTL 2005-A Trust v. 2137-2153 Nostrand Avenue Associates, L.P. 69 AD3d 697 at 698 p. 671
- Santiago v. Sansue Realty Corp. 243 AD2d 622 at 623 p. 671
- Hamilton Public Relations v. Scientivity, LLC 129 AD3d 1025 at 1026 p. 672
- Castle v. Avanti, Ltd. 86 AD3d 531 at 532 p. 672
- Peck v. Dybo Realty Corp. 77 AD3d 640 at 641 p. 672